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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
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AVTOKRATIJA›How the system changes public administration and public services
49
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

Why do employees find it harder to say 'no' when their job or term continually depends on a new government decision?

Confidence in the conclusioncurrently cautious and case-dependent
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources4
Period2012-2026; data for 2021

Employees tend to say “no” when their contract, position or mandate soon expires and the extension is decided by the person whose decision they should control. He does not have to get a direct order; it is enough to know how the predecessors who objected have passed. Then he begins to adjust reports in advance, postpone sensitive items and choose a safer interpretation of the rules.

Temporary status thus turns personal existential risk into a mechanism of institutional control. Not every contract on a certain political pressure and temporary work can have a justified reason. A sign of the problem is when the temporary lasts for a long time in managerial and supervisory positions, when the renewal of the mandate does not have clear professional criteria and when it coincides with obedience in cases important to the government.

Example from SerbiaChecked connection 4 sources; waiting for saturation pass
4 related sources; Serbia not yet logged on Saturation Pass

At the end of 2021, 213 of the 408 highest civil-service positions in Serbia were filled by acting officials. A person who knows that their position will soon depend once again on a political signature will find it harder to stop an unlawful order, insist on an unwelcome professional opinion, or leave a written record of disagreement. Temporary status thus becomes a silent command even though no one has uttered a threat.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

CEP calculated the share of acting officials and described the long-running circumvention of regular competitive recruitment; the European Commission and PAR Monitor confirm that the problem of politicisation persists.

02 Our interpretation

A permanent term does not guarantee courage, but it reduces the personal cost of a professional 'no'. Repeated short-term renewal turns a lawful career into a series of political loyalty checks.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes this is one of the most concretely measurable Serbian mechanisms of dependence of the administration.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

It cannot be concluded that every acting official is obedient or unqualified. The evidence concerns the institutional incentive and the violation of the purpose of a temporary exception.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

Recent research often measures what employees say they would do, not their actual decisions. The finding is therefore an important indication, but not definitive evidence of behaviour.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

surveys in several countries

Schuster, C. i dr. (2022), „Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals“, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 32(2): 416–435.

Contribution to this answer
Schuster and co-authors show that officials are not automatically obedient when they consider that a political order harms the public interest: many are trying to persuade the leadership to give up, and some would rather leave or oppose. The paper, however, does not investigate whether an uncertain mandate or the possibility of an easy shift reduces the willingness to say “no”.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), „Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding“, Perspectives on Politics.

Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), “Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding,” Perspectives on Politics.

Contribution to this answer
It shows that the expected politicization and the feeling that officials will have less influence increase the desire to leave and reduce the willingness to speak out and make additional efforts. This is close to our question, but the authors do not test specifically the effect of the temporary contract, acting status or mandate that the government can constantly renew or terminate.
Open source ↗
A03

Investigation of the conduct of civil servants

Gilad, S., Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. i Levi-Faur, D. (2025), „A Taste for Government Employment Also Rests on Its Political Flavor“, Public Administration Review 85(5): 1412–1425.

Contribution to this answer
This paper is very indirect for the question: it studies who wants to get a job in the state administration at a politically polarized moment. It does not study existing employees, their mandates or the decision whether to oppose the leadership.
Open source ↗
A04

comparing several countries or cases

Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), „Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention“, Public Money & Management 46(4).

Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), “Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention”, Public Money & Management 46(4).

Contribution to this answer
Staroová, Ryb and Spáč show that officials who expect the arrival of illiberal authorities can start thinking about leaving even before the change occurs especially those with a strong motivation for public service and when they expect a conflict over integrity and values. But this work does not study uncertain mandates or temporary appointments either.
Open source ↗
A05

review more research

Dahlström, C. i Lapuente, V. (2022), „Comparative Bureaucratic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 43–63.

Contribution to this answer
Dahlstrm and Lapuente explain why the professional autonomy of bureaucracy can be important versus immediate political control. This gives a theoretical logic to the question but the review does not test specifically whether the person whose re-appointment depends on the authorities therefore says “no” less often.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026

European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.

What the source records
At the end of 2021, acting officials occupied 52% of the highest civil-service positions, making temporary appointment a customary way of retaining political control.
Claim it supports
The claim that short and continually renewed terms increase the personal cost of professional refusal and a manager's dependence on a political signature.
Source limitation
Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Open source ↗
S02

Regional NGO monitoring of public administration - Verified 21.08.2026

WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkan PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.

What the source records
For Serbia, it records persistent gaps between formal reform and the experience of citizens and civil servants, especially in recruitment, transparency, and accountability.
Claim it supports
The claim that short and continually renewed terms increase the personal cost of professional refusal and a manager's dependence on a political signature.
Source limitation
The regional methodology gives a comparison, but does not explain every institution or every bad result with political pressure.
Open source ↗
S03

Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.

What the source records
The report records weak electoral conditions, limited parliamentary oversight, strong political pressure on the judiciary, and concern that in practice the president directs decision-making beyond the constitutional design.
Claim it supports
The claim that short and continually renewed terms increase the personal cost of professional refusal and a manager's dependence on a political signature.
Source limitation
The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Open source ↗
S04

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929

What the source records
The article links democratic decline to rules and economic incentives that allow the authorities to turn public resources into political advantage.
Claim it supports
The claim that short and continually renewed terms increase the personal cost of professional refusal and a manager's dependence on a political signature.
Source limitation
It is a causal interpretation of a long process; it does not cover developments beyond 2019 and does not exclude other explanations.
Open source ↗

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AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

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Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

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Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

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