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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

06 / 20

WHY THIS AREA MATTERS

How the ruling party and local networks hold the system together

The party and local intermediaries connect the top of the government with jobs, services, and citizens' everyday needs. Political support can then become a condition for something that should be a right.
AVTOKRATIJA›What elections are for when they are not fair
22
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

How can elections be unfair if no one stole my vote?

Confidence in the conclusionwell supported
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources10
Periodespecially the 2023 elections

Elections can be deeply unfair even when each box is counted correctly. The advantage can be made months or years earlier: by controlling the most viewed media, using public money and official campaign events, pressing employees and donors, making it difficult to run or selectively applying the law.

The voter then formally chooses, but does not choose between competitors who had approximately equal opportunity to present the program, organize supporters and protect themselves from punishment. A fair count cannot subsequently equal such a game. However, not every irregularity is proof that the entire outcome was staged; it is necessary to determine how widespread, planned, repeated and capable of changing the behavior of voters or opponents of the government.

Example from SerbiaChecked 10 sources; 9 manufacturers
5 linked sources; 4 of them domestic NGO or research sources

Elections can be unfair even when the polling-station record adds up the ballots correctly. In Serbia, observers in 2023 recorded months-long media dominance by the authorities, campaigning by public officials, pressure on voters, misuse of public resources, and ineffective resolution of disputes. This means that freedom of choice can be narrowed before a voter picks up a pen and after the ballot box is closed.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

ODIHR and CRTA distinguish the technical conduct of voting from the overall fairness of the campaign and document serious problems in both phases. YIHR and the Human Rights Committee Bujanovac additionally document that the passivisation of Albanian residence addresses can lead to removal from the voter register and loss of voting rights before election day itself.

02 Our interpretation

Fair election process includes informing, running, financing, freedom from pressure, voting, counting and effective appeal failure on any link can change the real competition.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes the Serbian example is very direct proof that proper counting is not enough.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Documented inequality does not make it possible to calculate reliably how each citizen would have voted under ideal conditions. The integrity of the process is therefore assessed, not an imagined result.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

A single irregularity does not prove that it determined the result. It is necessary to show how widespread it was, whether it was planned, and whom it harmed.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

comparing several countries or cases

Schedler, A. (2013), The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism, Oxford University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Schedler shows that electoral injustice doesn’t just start with counting votes: the government can limit the media, opposition, resources, candidacy and competition rules much earlier. The choice can be seriously unfair and without stealing a concrete vote at the polling station.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Levitsky, S. i Way, L. A. (2010), Competitive Authoritarianism, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Levitsky and Way describe a “nervous terrain” in which the opposition is formally allowed to compete, but the government systematically uses the state, media and other resources to have a huge advantage before the vote.
Open source ↗
A03

Explain how the system works

Greene, K. F. (2007), Why Dominant Parties Lose, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Greene on Mexico shows how the dominant party builds a long-term advantage by controlling state resources and organization. The opposition can therefore enter the elections, and yet compete against the system that has made it difficult for it to become an equal rival for years.
Open source ↗
A04

comparing several countries or cases

Howard, M. M. i Roessler, P. G. (2006), „Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes“, American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 365–381.

Contribution to this answer
"Howard and Roessler show that elections under authoritarianism involve different combinations of coercion and manipulation, but also that the opposition coalition can open up space for an unexpectedly liberalizing outcome.
Open source ↗
A05

Study of Serbia

Petrović, V. (2026), „Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia“, Democratization.

Petrović, V. (2026), “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia”, Democratization.

Contribution to this answer
Petrović shows how political pressure and dependence on work or public resources can change the behavior of voters and activists even before the election day. Injustice can therefore arise through everyday addiction, and not just through fraud when counting.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Official election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

OSCE/ODIHR. 2024. Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 December 2023 — Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

What the source records
The observation mission recorded a genuine choice among political alternatives, but also the president's decisive involvement, systemic advantages for the authorities, media bias, pressure, and misuse of public resources.
Claim it supports
The distinction between orderly ballot counting and an unfair campaign, pressure, media advantage, and misuse of public resources.
Source limitation
Proves the quality of one electoral process, not independently the entire type of regime or all the events after February 2024.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report – 2023. Beograd: CRTA Election Observation Mission.

What the source records
CRTA assesses that the elections were not free and fair and records serious irregularities at 13% of observed polling stations in the parliamentary elections and 21% in the Belgrade elections, alongside documented pressure, institutional passivity, and organised voter migration.
Claim it supports
The distinction between orderly ballot counting and an unfair campaign, pressure, media advantage, and misuse of public resources.
Source limitation
The finding refers to one election cycle and represents an expert assessment of the domestic observation mission, not a court ruling or independent classification of the entire regime.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
The monitoring finds that more than half of the airtime allocated to political actors went to the president, who had 354 live television appearances and received almost exclusively neutral or positive treatment.
Claim it supports
The distinction between orderly ballot counting and an unfair campaign, pressure, media advantage, and misuse of public resources.
Source limitation
The sample includes the central news of five national TV stations, but does not measure all media, the entire program offer, the audience or the direct impact of such reporting on voting.
Open source ↗
S04

Domestic NGO campaign financing monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Povećanje nesrazmere među akterima, procena ukupne vrednosti kampanje i preliminarni izveštaji: monitoring izbora 2023. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija.

What the source records
The monitoring records promotion of the governing list through public resources, intensive campaigning by public officials, a lack of timely response by the competent authorities, and estimates that permitted direct campaign spending was no less than EUR 20 million.
Claim it supports
The distinction between orderly ballot counting and an unfair campaign, pressure, media advantage, and misuse of public resources.
Source limitation
It is a preliminary and narrowly thematic report for a single campaign; part of the conclusions are estimates and arguments for doubts, not legally determined infringements.
Open source ↗
S05

Local NGO and local partner field research - Verified 21.08.2026

Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava i Odbor za ljudska prava Bujanovac. 2023. Pasivizacija adresa Albanaca u Preševskoj dolini kao diskriminatorna praksa. Beograd i Bujanovac: YIHR Srbija i Odbor za ljudska prava Bujanovac.

What the source records
Links the passivisation of residence addresses to removal from the voter register and the loss of the ability to vote.
Claim it supports
Shows that an election can be impaired before election day by an administrative decision about who remains on the voter register.
Source limitation
The dedicated sample and incomplete administrative availability do not allow for the assessment of all passivated addresses; the report documents the affected cases and the pattern, not each individual procedure.
Open source ↗
S06

Reviewed scientific paper analysis of election strategies - Viewed full open work, method, findings and bibliographic record

Bursać, Dejan, and Dušan Vučićević. 2025. “Electioneering Strategies in the Hybrid Regime: Another Regular Snap Election in Serbia.” New Perspectives 33(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X241308429

What the source records
Document unequal access to media, public funds and institutions and interference of state and party activities before voting.
Claim it supports
Directly confirms that proper counting does not remove the advantage created before the election day.
Source limitation
The study interprets strategies from public events, election data and secondary sources; it does not present an experiment or direct evidence of motives for any decision to call an election.
Open source ↗
S07

Reviewed academic election analysis - Full paper, bibliography, election data and conclusion

Ilić, Vujo, and Gazela Pudar Draško. 2022. “2022 Elections in Serbia: The Return of the Opposition?” Contemporary Southeastern Europe 9(2): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.25364/02.9:2022.2.1

What the source records
For 2022, it separates a wide selection of candidates and the return of the opposition from the continued misuse of public resources, media imbalances and pressures.
Claim it supports
It shows how the choice can be really competitive, and yet not equal.
Source limitation
Analytical work relies in part on observer reports and public sources; it does not give a universal boycott rule or an independent rate of all electoral pressures.
Open source ↗
S08

Domestic NGOs multi-cycle election monitoring and dispute analysis - Reviewed full report, method, dispute tables and recommendations

CeSID. 2024. Oko izbora 24. Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju.

What the source records
Analyse the campaign, electoral list, election day and 165 legal proceedings with evidence, with different outcomes.
Claim it supports
Helps to separate allegations, documented irregularity, legal outcome and a wider assessment of fairness.
Source limitation
The report combines observation, legal analysis and reported allegations; not all allegations have been proven, and the accepted or rejected objection does not necessarily address a broader political pattern.
Open source ↗
S09

International Network of Election Observers Final Report - Reviewed full final report, method and recommendations

European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO). 2022. Presidential and Early Parliamentary Elections, 3 April 2022, Serbia — Final Report.

What the source records
ENEMO notes an unequal campaign, institutional advantage and allegations of pressure on employees and voters.
Claim it supports
Adds an independent international confirmation that freedom of choice can be narrowed before entering the polling station.
Source limitation
The observation report does not convert the reported allegation into a judicially established fact and does not measure the national rate of any form of pressure.
Open source ↗
S10

Official international election monitoring - Full official report reviewed

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 2024. Observation of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Serbia (17 December 2023). Doc. 15895.

What the source records
PACE for the 2023 elections considers the dominant position of the government, the media, the campaign and the reported problems with the electoral roll and the organized bringing of voters.
Claim it supports
Expands the fairness check from counting to equal campaigning and integrity of administrative conditions.
Source limitation
PACE participated in a joint international observation mission with ODIHR and other delegations, so this report is an additional institutional check, but it is not a fully independent event or dataset.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

Who is behind AUTLAS?

AUTLAS and AVtokratija were conceived and are developed by Civic Initiatives. Content is updated in line with new research and reliable data.

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