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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

05 / 20

WHY THIS AREA MATTERS

What elections are for when they are not fair

Elections can show those in power where they have support, create an appearance of a right to govern, and strengthen control over their own party. But they can also open space for collective resistance and defeat.
AVTOKRATIJA›What elections are for when they are not fair
24
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

When does a 'guaranteed vote' become pressure or blackmail?

Confidence in the conclusionquite substantiated, with important conditions
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources9
Period201825

Asking for a “safe voice” becomes pressure or blackmail when political support is no longer voluntary, but is associated with work, help, treatment, contract, permission or safety.

It is not necessary for someone to openly say “voting or losing your job”: it is enough for the mediator to ask for lists, photos, attendance at a gathering or information about family members and for people to believe that he can enforce the sentence. The secrecy of the vote does not then take away the pressure, because the government can punish the very disobedience, the refusal to promise the vote or the weak result of the entire working environment. The border is therefore in the freedom of choice. Political persuasion offers a reason to vote.

Example from SerbiaChecked 9 sources; 7 manufacturers
9 related sources; 7 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 5

A “safe voice” becomes a pressure when a citizen not only makes a political promise, but believes that he must prove his voice in order to preserve his job, contract, help or peace. CRTA’s public sector and social protection testimonies describe calls, lists, the obligation to bring in other voters and the threat of loss of benefits. The pressure can also exist without a spoken threat if addiction and earlier punishments clearly show the consequences of disobedience.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

Qualitative surveys record repeated patterns among fixed-term employees, aid beneficiaries, party members and other dependent groups; the ODIHR cites concerns about the freedom of the electorate.

02 Our interpretation

The border is the freedom to withdraw the promise and the vote remains secret without consequence. When a political decision is monitored, conditioned or punished, it is no longer an ordinary campaign.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes sources describe the mechanism in detail, although they do not measure how widespread each of its forms is.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Anonymous testimonies protect people, but make it difficult to independently check each case. That is why we cross-check them with election monitoring and do not use them as an estimate of the percentage of all voters under pressure.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

Fear and surveillance are difficult to prove. It is necessary to distinguish rumors from real threats, monitoring of people and the possibility that the punishment will actually be carried out.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

Explain how the system works

Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M. i Brusco, V. (2013), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Stokes and co-authors show how local mediators can associate work, assistance or other benefits with political support and how they try to assess who to trust. This relationship can also produce pressure when formal voting remains secret.
Open source ↗
A02

review more research

Hicken, A. (2011), „Clientelism“, Annual Review of Political Science 14: 289–310.

Contribution to this answer
Hicken separates clientelism from general corruption: the key is a targeted, conditioned relationship in which the concrete benefit is given in exchange for political support. This explains how pressure can arise around elections without direct control of the ballot.
Open source ↗
A03

critical review of more research

Hicken, A. i Nathan, N. L. (2020), „Clientelism’s Red Herrings: Dead Ends and New Directions in the Study of Nonprogrammatic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 23: 277–294.

Contribution to this answer
Hicken and Nathan warn that clientelism does not require that the party can really check how the individual voted. Personal connections, repeated exchange and expectation of reciprocity can maintain the system even under secret voting.
Open source ↗
A04

data from a large number of countries

Bhasin, T. i Gandhi, J. (2013), „Timing and Targeting of State Repression in Authoritarian Elections“, Electoral Studies 32(4): 620–631.

Contribution to this answer
Bhasin and Gandhi show that the authoritarian government strategically chooses who to pressure: it targets opposition leaders and activists more often before the elections, while the wide pressure on voters can be more politically expensive while their votes are still needed.
Open source ↗
A05

Study of Serbia

Petrović, V. (2026), „Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia“, Democratization.

Petrović, V. (2026), “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia”, Democratization.

Contribution to this answer
Petrovic shows how benefits and coercion can be combined in the same political relationship in Serbia: access to work or public resources can be at the same time a reward for support and a source of fear of loss.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Domestic NGOs qualitative field research - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2023. Mreža političkih pritisaka u centrima za socijalni rad. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
Testimonials describe centers as points in a hierarchical network in which business, contract and assistance can be linked to political loyalty and electoral mobilization.
Claim it supports
The claim that a 'safe voice' goes into blackmail when political choice is followed, conditioned, or associated with work, assistance, or other consequences.
Source limitation
The sample is qualitative and anonymous; the findings reveal mechanisms and patterns, but do not measure their frequency in all centers.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs qualitative election research - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2022. Preliminarni izveštaj o izbornom nasilju i korupciji. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
The report describes repeated patterns of reward and punishment towards fixed-term employees, party members, poor and other dependent groups.
Claim it supports
The claim that a 'safe voice' goes into blackmail when political choice is followed, conditioned, or associated with work, assistance, or other consequences.
Source limitation
The deliberate and “snowball” pattern is not representative and the statements are not the same as the legally established facts in any case.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic NGOs election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report – 2023. Beograd: CRTA Election Observation Mission.

What the source records
CRTA estimates that the elections were not free and fair and recorded serious irregularities in 13% of the polling stations observed in the parliamentary and 21% in the Belgrade elections, with documented pressures, institutional passivity and organized migration of voters.
Claim it supports
The claim that a 'safe voice' goes into blackmail when political choice is followed, conditioned, or associated with work, assistance, or other consequences.
Source limitation
The finding refers to one election cycle and represents an expert assessment of the domestic observation mission, not a court ruling or independent classification of the entire regime.
Open source ↗
S04

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349

What the source records
The paper shows that the exchange of services and coercion is intertwined and that the exposure depends on local political and economic competition, employment and social position.
Claim it supports
The claim that a 'safe voice' goes into blackmail when political choice is followed, conditioned, or associated with work, assistance, or other consequences.
Source limitation
Measures of experience and observation in one year; cannot verify each reported practice as a single legal case.
Open source ↗
S05

Domestic NGOs multi-cycle election monitoring and dispute analysis - Reviewed full report, method, dispute tables and recommendations

CeSID. 2024. Oko izbora 24. Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju.

What the source records
CeSID notes the allegations of pressures and recommends stronger bans on misuse of state resources and pressure on public employees.
Claim it supports
Adds a domestic manufacturer different from CRTA for the difference between campaign persuasion and work or existential coercion.
Source limitation
The report combines observation, legal analysis and reported allegations; not all allegations have been proven, and the accepted or rejected objection does not necessarily address a broader political pattern.
Open source ↗
S06

Official international election monitoring - Review of the official final report and recommendations

OSCE/ODIHR. 2022. Republic of Serbia: Presidential and Early Parliamentary Elections, 3 April 2022 — Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

What the source records
ODIHR for 2022 is concerned about pressure on voters and public employees and recommends effective protection against intimidation.
Claim it supports
substantiate that the secrecy of the ballot does not remove pressure before voting or in the workplace.
Source limitation
It refers to one election cycle; as a second ODIHR report it increases the time span, but does not represent a new independent producer compared to ODIHR 2023.
Open source ↗
S07

International Network of Election Observers Final Report - Reviewed full final report, method and recommendations

European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO). 2022. Presidential and Early Parliamentary Elections, 3 April 2022, Serbia — Final Report.

What the source records
ENEMO transmits allegations of intimidation and labour pressure, including employees whose livelihood depends on the employer or the public sector.
Claim it supports
Directly supports the criterion that a secure vote becomes blackmail when the rejection has a real economic consequence.
Source limitation
The observation report does not convert the reported allegation into a judicially established fact and does not measure the national rate of any form of pressure.
Open source ↗
S08

Reviewed scientific paper quantitative study of the network - Viewed full work, method, tables and bibliographic record

Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015.” Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3

What the source records
In one local party network, it connects secured votes and network position with patronage employment.
Claim it supports
Shows the material basis of pressure credibility: an intermediary can link political performance and business.
Source limitation
An anonymised city board and 2015 data do not represent the whole party, all cities or the current situation; records are retrospective and do not establish the legality of every employment.
Open source ↗
S09

Reviewed scientific paper municipal panel and political data - View full work and bibliographic record

Dragojević, Mila, and Andy Konitzer. 2013. “The Forensics of Patronage: Identifying the Linkage Between Parties and Public Sector Employment in Serbia.” Sociološki pregled 47(1): 3–22.

What the source records
At the level of more than 165 municipalities, there is a link between the party structure of local government and employment in public enterprises.
Claim it supports
Provides wider evidence that the workplace can be part of the political distribution on which pressure relies.
Source limitation
Data precede the current government and measures aggregate connectivity, not the motive or responsibility of the individual; local coalitions and the labour market changed after 2009.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

Who is behind AUTLAS?

AUTLAS and AVtokratija were conceived and are developed by Civic Initiatives. Content is updated in line with new research and reliable data.

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