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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

06 / 20

WHY THIS AREA MATTERS

How the ruling party and local networks hold the system together

The party and local intermediaries connect the top of the government with jobs, services, and citizens' everyday needs. Political support can then become a condition for something that should be a right.
AVTOKRATIJA›How the ruling party and local networks hold the system together
28
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

How do party membership or activism become a route to a job, contract, or protection?

Confidence in the conclusionquite substantiated, with important conditions
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources11
Period201226

Party booklet or activism becomes a way to benefit when the government has a major impact on employment, public contracts, permits, inspections and protection from problems. In such an environment, political work serves as evidence that someone is reliable, willing to return the favor and unlikely to publicly oppose it.

People can, therefore, glue posters, bring voters or attend gatherings not out of conviction, but because they estimate that without it they find it harder to get a job or keep an existing one. The system thus turns existential uncertainty into a political resource. One party employment is not enough to conclude; a repeated pattern in which political activity and benefit are connected is important, and professional criteria, public competition and the right of appeal have little real weight.

Example from SerbiaChecked 11 sources; 9 manufacturers
11 related sources; 9 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 8

Party booklet rarely appears as a formal requirement in the competition. In Serbia, political eligibility is more often seen through temporary contracts, recommendations, work on party stands and meetings, progress without clear benchmarks or the expectation that the employee will provide votes. When access to work depends on the network, the employee owes security to the party, not the rules and professional result.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

CRTA records testimonies of employees and unemployed about party work and pressures, CEP documents dependent appointments, and clientelism surveys connect parties, the public sector and the labour market.

02 Our interpretation

The system does not have to employ everyone along the party line; it is enough for enough people to believe that without a political connection there is no access or advancement, so they adapt in advance.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes different sources confirm the connection, but none measures the unique percentage of all jobs obtained politically.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Party membership is legal, and a party member can be an expert. The problem is unequal procedure: hidden criteria of loyalty, conflict of interest and the use of a public workplace for political obligation.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The fact that politically connected people benefit more often does not in itself prove the agreement. It is necessary to compare similar people and monitor when the relationship arose.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

Explain how the system works

Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M. i Brusco, V. (2013), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Stokes and co-authors show that business, assistance or other targeted benefits can be the political currency with which brokers build lasting support relationships.
Open source ↗
A02

review more research

Hicken, A. (2011), „Clientelism“, Annual Review of Political Science 14: 289–310.

Contribution to this answer
Hicken shows that clientelism rests on a conditioned, personalized distribution of benefits. If the party network controls access to a job or service, political activity can become a practical path to resources.
Open source ↗
A03

Study of Serbia

Petrović, V. (2026), „Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia“, Democratization.

Petrović, V. (2026), “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia”, Democratization.

Contribution to this answer
Petrović shows how access to work and other public resources can be linked to political support and pressure in Serbia, so the party connection gains material value in everyday life.
Open source ↗
A04

Explain how the system works

Greene, K. F. (2007), Why Dominant Parties Lose, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Greene shows how the dominant party uses state and public resources control to build an organizational advantage and a dependency network that the opposition can hardly make up for.
Open source ↗
A05

surveys in several countries

Schuster, C. i dr. (2022), „Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals“, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 32(2): 416–435.

Contribution to this answer
Schuster and co-authors study employees who are already in the public administration and their reactions to politically problematic orders. This is useful for the consequences of politicization, but it is circumstantial evidence for the very idea that party activism opens up access to work.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Domestic NGOs qualitative election research - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2022. Preliminarni izveštaj o izbornom nasilju i korupciji. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
The report describes repeated patterns of reward and punishment towards fixed-term employees, party members, poor and other dependent groups.
Claim it supports
Claim that political suitability is transferred through temporary work, recommendation, promotion and expected party activity, and not necessarily through a written condition.
Source limitation
The deliberate and “snowball” pattern is not representative and the statements are not the same as the legally established facts in any case.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026

European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.

What the source records
At the end of 2021, officials accounted for 52% of the highest official positions, so temporary appointments became a common way of retaining political control.
Claim it supports
Claim that political suitability is transferred through temporary work, recommendation, promotion and expected party activity, and not necessarily through a written condition.
Source limitation
Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Open source ↗
S03

Regional NGO monitoring of public administration - Verified 21.08.2026

WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkan PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.

What the source records
For Serbia, there are persistent gaps between formal reform and the experience of citizens and officials, especially in employment, transparency and accountability.
Claim it supports
Claim that political suitability is transferred through temporary work, recommendation, promotion and expected party activity, and not necessarily through a written condition.
Source limitation
The regional methodology gives a comparison, but does not explain every institution or every bad result with political pressure.
Open source ↗
S04

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C

What the source records
The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
Claim it supports
Claim that political suitability is transferred through temporary work, recommendation, promotion and expected party activity, and not necessarily through a written condition.
Source limitation
It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Open source ↗
S05

Reviewed scientific paper quantitative study of the network - Viewed full work, method, tables and bibliographic record

Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015.” Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3

What the source records
Finds a link between secured votes, network position and party employment in a city board.
Claim it supports
It shows most directly how activism and electoral performance can become the way to work.
Source limitation
An anonymised city board and 2015 data do not represent the whole party, all cities or the current situation; records are retrospective and do not establish the legality of every employment.
Open source ↗
S06

Reviewed scientific paper municipal panel and political data - View full work and bibliographic record

Dragojević, Mila, and Andy Konitzer. 2013. “The Forensics of Patronage: Identifying the Linkage Between Parties and Public Sector Employment in Serbia.” Sociološki pregled 47(1): 3–22.

What the source records
In more than 165 municipalities, it connects local ruling coalitions with employment in public enterprises.
Claim it supports
Gives wider aggregate evidence that public employment is a resource of party and coalition patronage.
Source limitation
Data precede the current government and measures aggregate connectivity, not the motive or responsibility of the individual; local coalitions and the labour market changed after 2009.
Open source ↗
S07

peer-reviewed scientific paper comparative case studies - Viewed full text and bibliographic record

Tomić, Slobodan, and Dušan Pavlović. 2023. “Blatant, Not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 16(1): 181–209. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008

What the source records
Three studies of senior appointments link patronage to political control, resources, and clientelistic goals.
Claim it supports
Shows that the benefit is not only the initial job but also the position, contract, control and protection at the top of the system.
Source limitation
The three deliberately selected cases do not represent all high appointments; the patronage function and consequences are reconstructed by the authors from documents and publicly available data.
Open source ↗
S08

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Vuković, Danilo, i Bojan Spaić. 2022. “Parallel Normative Reality: The Informal Order of Corruption and Clientelism in Serbia.” Sociologija 64(4): 519–542. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC2204519V

What the source records
Describes informal rules of corruption and clientelism that may have more practical significance than public competition or formal law.
Claim it supports
substantiates why a booklet or link becomes a signal of reliability when formal criteria are weak.
Source limitation
The finding describes corruption and clientelism; it does not in itself determine the type of regime or show that any illegality is centrally driven.
Open source ↗
S09

Domestic NGOs analysis of public companies - Verified 21.08.2026

Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Public Enterprises — A Symbol of Abuses and Violation of the Law. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.

What the source records
Document political influence, office holders and weak competitions in public companies.
Claim it supports
Adds sectoral evidence that management posts and decisions are subject to political distribution.
Source limitation
Anti-corruption analysis identifies risks and documented irregularities, but does not prove the criminal responsibility of every manager or company.
Open source ↗
S10

International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed

OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.

What the source records
SIGMA meritoriousness of employment, acting status, professionalization and responsibility of public administration.
Claim it supports
Independently confirms that weak professional and competition mechanisms leave room for political dependence.
Source limitation
The data mostly ends in mid-2024; the new methodology limits direct comparison of recent reports with older cycles, and part of the findings uses administration data and interviews.
Open source ↗
S11

Domestic NGOs analysis of political integrity - Verified 21.08.2026

Transparency Serbia. 2024. Assessing Political Integrity Rules in Serbia. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.

What the source records
Analyzes the rules of political integrity, conflict of interest and separation of public resources from party interests.
Claim it supports
Provides a normative and institutional test for distinguishing lawful political activity from public benefit trade.
Source limitation
The assessment of the rules and their application determines the institutional risks, not the guilt of the person concerned without due process.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

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