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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

06 / 20

WHY THIS AREA MATTERS

How the ruling party and local networks hold the system together

The party and local intermediaries connect the top of the government with jobs, services, and citizens' everyday needs. Political support can then become a condition for something that should be a right.
AVTOKRATIJA›How the ruling party and local networks hold the system together
30
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

When does the ruling party protect the system, and when does it become a threat to the leader?

Confidence in the conclusionquite substantiated, with important conditions
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources9
Period199026

The ruling party guards the system when it connects the top with the local level, chooses successors, rewards work, punishes offenses and resolves conflicts before they become dangerous. Members then know which path they can take and why it is more worthwhile for them to stay together than to leave power.

The same organization, however, can become a threat to the leader if its managers control their own people, money and information and can agree without it. The leader therefore often tries to weaken the internal rules, bypass the party authorities and bind the functions to personal loyalty. It is a practical measure whether the party can change an important decision or choose a new leader according to its own rules, or only confirms what one person has already decided.

Example from SerbiaChecked 9 sources; 8 manufacturers
9 related sources; 8 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 6

In today’s Serbia, the SNS is strongly subordinated to the top and does not have a publicly visible faction that can threaten the president, so the country is not a good clean example of a party that turned against the leader. However, the history of the SPS, JUL and the coalition of the nineties shows why the leader of the party at the same time needs and is dangerous: it owns local networks, personnel and information that can survive defeat or be redirected to the new center.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

SNS studies and parliamentary presidencialization record a high level of centralization, while transitional literature shows the continuity of party networks even after the fall of Milosevic.

02 Our interpretation

The party preserves the system while transmitting orders and mobilizing support; it becomes a threat when its executives can coordinate to deny obedience or offer the apparatus to another leader.

03 Does it show the same process?

Partially Serbia shows well the leader’s dependence on and control over the party, but not the contemporary open conflict between the leader and the ruling party.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

There is no direct evidence about the future behavior of SNS after the change of leaders. It is an analytical possibility based on organizational structure and historical comparison, not prediction.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The party changes over time. To know whether it is a support or a threat to the leader, we need to monitor who has the money, the people and the right to make decisions.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

comparing several countries or cases

Magaloni, B. (2008), „Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule“, Comparative Political Studies 41(4–5): 715–741.

Contribution to this answer
Magaloni shows that a strong ruling party stabilizes the regime precisely because it gives the elites the expected future benefits and space within the system. But it also creates organized actors who are not completely without power to the leader.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Brownlee, J. (2007), Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Brownlee shows that the institutionalized party can keep the elites together and limit the personalization of the regime. The party therefore simultaneously protects the system and preserves a part of the collective power against a single leader.
Open source ↗
A03

comparing several countries or cases

Reuter, O. J. (2017), The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Reuter shows that the dominant party connects the leader with local and economic elites and helps him to coordinate them. That is why these elites become important partners whose interests the leader cannot completely ignore.
Open source ↗
A04

Development and verification of measurement methods

Meng, A. (2021), „Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Rethinking Institutional Strength“, British Journal of Political Science 51(2): 526–540.

Contribution to this answer
Meng shows that a strong ruling party is not only an extension of the founder: when it has its own organization and permanence, it can stabilize the regime, but also represent an actual institutional structure that outlives the individual.
Open source ↗
A05

review more research

Meng, A., Paine, J. i Powell, R. (2023), „Authoritarian Power Sharing“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.

Contribution to this answer
Meng, Paine and Powell show that power sharing only works when the allies have the means to implement the deal. The institution that protects the leader from chaos therefore also gives a piece of power to the people with whom he has to rule.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17

What the source records
"The paper links presidencialization with the immediate election of the president, weaknesses in constitutional design, proportional elections and oligarchic parties.
Claim it supports
The claim that a leader needs a broad party network, but that it is its organization and resources that can survive a leader or become an independent center of power.
Source limitation
It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Open source ↗
S02

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C

What the source records
The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
Claim it supports
The claim that a leader needs a broad party network, but that it is its organization and resources that can survive a leader or become an independent center of power.
Source limitation
It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Open source ↗
S03

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929

What the source records
The work links the weakening of democracy with the rules and economic incentives that enable the authorities to turn public resources into a political advantage.
Claim it supports
The claim that a leader needs a broad party network, but that it is its organization and resources that can survive a leader or become an independent center of power.
Source limitation
It is a causal interpretation of a long process; it does not cover developments beyond 2019 and does not exclude other explanations.
Open source ↗
S04

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 1617–1638. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860

What the source records
The author concludes that Serbia under Vucic has returned to competitive authoritarianism through gradual rather than abrupt regime change.
Claim it supports
The claim that a leader needs a broad party network, but that it is its organization and resources that can survive a leader or become an independent center of power.
Source limitation
The classification depends on the thresholds chosen and the data for the most part precedes the 2020-2025 elections.
Open source ↗
S05

Academic chapter organizational analysis of political parties - Viewed bibliographic record, abstract, chapter coverage and conclusions

Stojiljković, Zoran, and Dušan Spasojević. 2017. “Serbia: Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Serbia.” In Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, eds. Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik, Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, and Piotr Borowiec, 369–390. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press.

What the source records
It distinguishes developed party structures from the SNS, which in the observed period strongly relied on the popularity of the leaders and did not yet have an equally solid organization.
Claim it supports
It supports the test of whether the party has its own rules and power centers or overwhelmingly confirms the decisions of the leaders.
Source limitation
The analysis ends around 2016 and relies in considerable part on statutes and formal procedures; it does not measure today’s local network, any informal decision or internal conflict.
Open source ↗
S06

Reviewed scientific paper analysis of election strategies - Viewed full open work, method, findings and bibliographic record

Bursać, Dejan, and Dušan Vučićević. 2025. “Electioneering Strategies in the Hybrid Regime: Another Regular Snap Election in Serbia.” New Perspectives 33(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X241308429

What the source records
“For 2023-2024, he shows that Vucic remained a practical informal leader of the SNS even after formally resigning as party president.
Claim it supports
Directly substantiates the leader-centricity and the difference between formal function and real political control.
Source limitation
The study interprets strategies from public events, election data and secondary sources; it does not present an experiment or direct evidence of motives for any decision to call an election.
Open source ↗
S07

International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

What the source records
The wider stability of the regime is associated with the dominant party and the personalised control of the institutions.
Claim it supports
It adds an independent confirmation that the party is guarding the system, but its autonomy is limited by a strong leader.
Source limitation
It is a periodic expert assessment with its own methodology, not a peer-reviewed work that isolates a single cause.
Open source ↗
S08

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Stojiljković, Zoran, i Dušan Spasojević. 2018. “Populistički Zeitgeist u ‘proevropskoj’ Srbiji.” Politička misao 55(3): 104–128. https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.55.3.04

What the source records
Analyzes the populist personalization and the way in which the leader and party are reshaping political representation in Serbia.
Claim it supports
Supports the interpretation of why a leader can weaken the autonomy of party rules and organs.
Source limitation
He studies populism and parties, and does not independently prove that the political system is authoritarian.
Open source ↗
S09

Domestic investigative journalism database - Verified 21.08.2026

Ćurčić, Teodora. 2024. Party Funds Database: SNS, the Financially Strongest Political Party in Serbia. Beograd: CINS.

What the source records
The party finance base shows the exceptional resource strength of SNS compared to competitors.
Claim it supports
Supports that the organization possesses the money and capacity that preserve the system and can outlive the individual campaign.
Source limitation
The data show reported finances and a large imbalance, but part of the difference is due to the election results and current rules, while unreported or illegal flows by definition are not fully visible in the database.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

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