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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

AVTOKRATIJA›How independent institutions are neutralized and crises are used
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Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

What can prosecutors, election commissions, ombuds institutions, and other oversight bodies really do in such a system?

Confidence in the conclusionBe cautious and dependent on the case.
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources11
Period201226

The Prosecutor’s Office, the Election Commission, the Ombudsman and other supervisory bodies can do as much as the powers, resources and willingness of others to implement their decisions. They can collect facts, publish findings, initiate procedures, cancel decisions or recommend change, but each of these bodies has a different job.

In the authoritarian environment, selective ability often arises: everyday cases are solved, while cases leading to the political summit are delayed, left without data or declared to be someone else’s jurisdiction. Therefore, they should not be declared worthless in advance or evaluated according to the number of statements. The right measure is what a specific body could and should have done, whether it tried in a politically sensitive case and what was the consequence of its actions.

Example from SerbiaChecked 11 sources; 10 manufacturers
11 related sources; 10 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 3

The Prosecutor’s Office, RIK, Ombudsman, Commissioner, Agency for Prevention of Corruption and other bodies in Serbia can collect data, initiate proceedings, make a recommendation or decision and put the problem to the public. Their limit is that they often depend on the cooperation of the police, ministry, court or assembly. If another authority does not provide the data, does not make a recommendation or does not impose a sentence, the supervisory authority can detect the problem, but not complete the responsibility.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

prEUgovor, Transparency Serbia, ODIHR and the European Commission record individual activities of these bodies, as well as delays, uneven application and limited effectiveness in politically important cases.

02 Our interpretation

Their value is not zero even when they are weak: they leave a document, a legal path and a place of gathering of resistance. But without a chain of execution, their finding can remain a warning without consequence.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes sources provide a balanced conclusion on actual powers and actual limitations.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Not all bodies need to be assessed the same. Their competencies, management and performance differ, so it is necessary to specify a specific body, period and type of decision for each claim.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The Prosecutor’s Office, the Electoral Commission, the Ombudsman and other supervisory bodies do not have the same job or the same powers. Everyone should be evaluated according to what he or she could and had to do.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

Historical data and comparison

Moustafa, T. (2007), The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Moustafa in Egypt shows that the court can gain real space to act and open legal channels to challenge the authorities, but also that the regime can re-strain that space when it becomes too politically dangerous.
Open source ↗
A02

review more research

Moustafa, T. (2014), „Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10: 281–299.

Contribution to this answer
Moustafa shows that institutions in autocracy are neither completely powerless nor completely independent: they can resolve real disputes and sometimes limit power, while the most politically sensitive cases remain under special pressure.
Open source ↗
A03

comparing several countries or cases

Ginsburg, T. i Moustafa, T. (ur.) (2008), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Ginsburg and Moustafa show that authoritarian courts can simultaneously serve the governance and legitimacy of the regime and create limited spaces for rights and resistance. Their actual range depends on the political context.
Open source ↗
A04

comparing several countries or cases

Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.

Contribution to this answer
Scheppele shows how the control institution can be weakened by changes in appointments, competencies and procedures, so the formal existence of the supervisory body does not tell how much it is really capable of reacting.
Open source ↗
A05

Detailed analysis of one or several cases

Laebens, M. G. i Lührmann, A. (2021), „What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of Accountability“, Democratization 28(5): 908–928.

Contribution to this answer
Laebens and Lhrmann show that democratic erosion can stop various combinations of horizontal, diagonal and vertical responsibility. Supervisory bodies have the greatest effect when they are not isolated, but work alongside the media, civil society and electoral competition.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.

What the source records
The report documents the simultaneous concentration of power, institutional abuses, pressures on the judiciary, selective fight against corruption, media control and repression against critics, with very few reforms implemented.
Claim it supports
Conclusion that the supervisory bodies can collect evidence and open the procedure, but that without cooperation and execution of other bodies they can often not complete the responsibility.
Source limitation
It is the semi-annual report of the coalition with a clear reform and advocacy role, so its evaluations should be checked through the above examples, documents and sources for each area.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs anti-corruption parallel report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đorđević, Miloš, i Nemanja Nenadić. 2023. Civil Society Report on the Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Serbia. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija i UNCAC Coalition.

What the source records
Based on regulations, organ reports, eight requests for access to information, consultations and documented cases, the authors find a broad formal framework, but a significantly larger problem in the ineffective or selective application of the rules.
Claim it supports
Conclusion that the supervisory bodies can collect evidence and open the procedure, but that without cooperation and execution of other bodies they can often not complete the responsibility.
Source limitation
The report is thematically related to UNCAC and ends in mid-2023, so it does not specify the type of regime or cover later development and all forms of political control.
Open source ↗
S03

Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.

What the source records
The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
Claim it supports
Conclusion that the supervisory bodies can collect evidence and open the procedure, but that without cooperation and execution of other bodies they can often not complete the responsibility.
Source limitation
The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Open source ↗
S04

Primary legal source - Verified 21.08.2026

Republika Srbija. 2006. Ustav Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik RS 98/2006, engleski prevod Narodne skupštine.

What the source records
The Constitution bases the system on balance and mutual control of power; the President expresses state unity, while the Government exercises executive and the Assembly exercises constitutional and legislative power.
Claim it supports
Conclusion that the supervisory bodies can collect evidence and open the procedure, but that without cooperation and execution of other bodies they can often not complete the responsibility.
Source limitation
The Constitution says that power should be distributed, but it does not show how powers are used in practice.
Open source ↗
S05

Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables

Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.

What the source records
The Commissioner reports on complaints, solutions, execution, supervision and restrictions on access to information.
Claim it supports
Allows the Commissioner to be assessed according to his own mandate: he can order access and publish the findings, but it depends on the execution and cooperation of others.
Source limitation
The report measures the cases that have reached the Commissioner and the conduct within his competence; it does not cover all the requirements in the country or determine the political motive of non-compliance.
Open source ↗
S06

Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables

Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije. 2026. Redovan godišnji izveštaj Zaštitnika građana za 2025. godinu.

What the source records
The Protector of Citizens shall provide the number and outcome of procedures, recommendations and the response of the authorities to them.
Claim it supports
It shows what an ombudsman can do: identify an omission, recommend a change and report it publicly, but it cannot replace the executive or the prosecution itself.
Source limitation
Data refer to the subject matter of the Protector and his own system of records; the high rate of conduct does not measure the quality of each response or the state of all control institutions.
Open source ↗
S07

Primary source annual report of the state anti-corruption body - Viewed full official report and tables

Agencija za sprečavanje korupcije Republike Srbije. 2026. Annual Report 2025.

What the source records
The Anti-Corruption Agency publishes its procedures, decisions, controls and resources for 2025.
Claim it supports
Provides primary data to assess whether the anti-corruption body uses legal powers, rather than being measured only by the number of statements.
Source limitation
It is an independent report of the body on its own work; the data show institutional scope and gaps, but do not represent an independent assessment of the effectiveness of each plan or decision.
Open source ↗
S08

Domestic NGOs multi-cycle election monitoring and dispute analysis - Reviewed full report, method, dispute tables and recommendations

CeSID. 2024. Oko izbora 24. Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju.

What the source records
Analyse the electoral administration, objections and outcomes of legal proceedings in the cycles 2023-2024.
Claim it supports
Helps RIK and other electoral bodies to be evaluated according to specific competences, evidence, deadlines and legal consequences.
Source limitation
The report combines observation, legal analysis and reported allegations; not all allegations have been proven, and the accepted or rejected objection does not necessarily address a broader political pattern.
Open source ↗
S09

International Technical Assessment of the Electoral System - Review full report, methodology and recommendations by area

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). 2021. Technical Election Assessment Mission in Serbia, March 2021.

What the source records
Technically assess the electoral administration, financing, accessibility and dispute resolution system.
Claim it supports
Adds an independent functional test of what the electoral commission and the supporting bodies can and where they depend on rules, resources and other bodies.
Source limitation
Technical system assessment, not direct campaign observation or representative measurement of voter pressure; it is funded by USAID support.
Open source ↗
S10

Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - The official chapter for Serbia, findings, recommendations and methodological limitations

European Commission. 2026. 2026 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2026) 931 final.

What the source records
Compare the actual work of the judiciary, anti-corruption bodies, REM, parliament and ombudsman with their mandates and recommendations.
Claim it supports
.
Source limitation
EU monitoring that combines data from authorities and actors; the same manufacturer as previous reports of the European Commission and therefore does not count as a new independent group when used together.
Open source ↗
S11

Official international report on compliance with anti-corruption recommendations - - Review of the official compliance report, evaluations by recommendations and conclusions

GRECO. 2026. Fifth Evaluation Round: Second Compliance Report on Serbia. GrecoRC5(2026)7. Adopted 12 June 2026; published 18 August 2026.

What the source records
For the top executive, the Agency, the police and the specialized prosecutor’s office evaluate specific recommendations, resources, appointments and autonomy.
Claim it supports
Gives an international check on what individual supervisory authorities have or have failed to change, without merging them into one category.
Source limitation
Measures compliance with selected recommendations, not the overall distribution of corruption; relies on both government data and collegial expert assessment.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

Who is behind AUTLAS?

AUTLAS and AVtokratija were conceived and are developed by Civic Initiatives. Content is updated in line with new research and reliable data.

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