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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

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AVTOKRATIJA›How democracy disappears step by step
10
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

How do we know that elections are no longer enough for a country to be democratic?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources17
Period201226; notably the 2023 election.

Elections are necessary for democracy, but they are not enough. The country is not really democratic if the opposition is allowed to be on the ballot, but it cannot freely organize, finance, speak in the media, protect its people from pressure and take power when it gets more votes.

It is important all the way to the elections and after them: who sets the rules, who uses state money, whether the courts resolve the objections independently and whether the defeated government accepts the result. Therefore, democracy is measured not only by counting the votes, but also by the rights, freedom of information, equal rules and the real uncertainty of the outcome. If the government can lose only on paper, the elections more confirm the existing power than they control it.

Example from SerbiaChecked 17 sources; 13 manufacturers
17 related sources; 13 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 6

In the elections in Serbia, voters receive more lists and votes are mostly counted in front of observers, but the game starts much earlier. ODIHR and CRTA record huge visibility of the government, misuse of public function and resources, pressures on a part of voters and inefficient protection of electoral law. Elections therefore remain important, but are not enough if one side enters the race for months with an advantage that the other can not realistically achieve.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

Observers for 2023 confirmed the political alternatives and the orderly implementation of many procedures, as well as unequal conditions, media dominance of the president and the ruling party and serious irregularities.

02 Our interpretation

Democratic choice is not only the exact sum of the ballots. Free choice is needed without blackmail, sufficient information, equal access to voters and effective procedure when the rule is broken.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes the example clearly shows the difference between the existence of elections and the democratic quality of the entire electoral process.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Irregular condition does not automatically mean that every vote is false or that the result can be exactly reversed. The claim is about systemic advantage and freedom of choice, not about calculating the hypothetical winner.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The division into ‘democracy’ and ‘non-democracy’ simplifies reality. It can hide how quickly, deeply and in what areas the country is going backwards.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

Development and verification of measurement methods

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. i Vreeland, J. R. (2010), „Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited“, Public Choice 143: 67–101.

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. i Vreeland, J. R. (2010), "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited", Public Choice 143: 67–101.

Contribution to this answer
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland show that it is not enough for elections to exist: the real possibility of the current government losing and leaving office is key. The regime with elections can still be a dictatorship if this shift is not real.
Open source ↗
A02

comparison of different types of systems

Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), „Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective“, Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.

Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective", Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.

Contribution to this answer
Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius show how broad the category of electoral authoritarian regimes is: holding multi-party elections does not remove major differences in actual competition and power distribution.
Open source ↗
A03

Development and verification of measurement methods

Teorell, J. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), „Beyond Democracy–Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789–2016“, Perspectives on Politics 17(1): 66–84.

Contribution to this answer
Teorell and Lindbergh show that direct elections can only be one of several sources of executive power. To understand the regime, we must also look at party, army, inheritance or parliamentary responsibility, and not just the electoral procedure.
Open source ↗
A04

review more research

Brancati, D. (2014), „Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects“, Annual Review of Political Science 17: 313–326.

Contribution to this answer
Brancati explains why autocrats organize elections and build parties and assemblies: these institutions can give them information, distribute benefits and stabilize the regime, so their existence is not evidence of democratic control of the government.
Open source ↗
A05

review more research

Little, A. T. i Meng, A. (2024), „What We Do and Do Not Know about Democratic Backsliding“, PS: Political Science & Politics 57(2): 224–229.

Little, A. T. i Meng, A. (2024), "What We Do and Do Not Know about Democratic Backsliding", PS: Political Science & Politics 57(2): 224–229.

Contribution to this answer
Little and Meng warn that different standards of democracy and autocracy can give different images of the same case. Disagreement and measurable uncertainty should therefore be openly displayed, not hidden behind a single label.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Official election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

OSCE/ODIHR. 2024. Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 December 2023 — Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

What the source records
The monitoring mission noted the real choice of political alternatives, but also the decisive participation of the president, the systemic advantages of the government, media bias, pressures and misuse of public resources.
Claim it supports
The most detailed official source for the 2023 elections distinguishes an orderly count from an unequal campaign and pressures.
Source limitation
Proves the quality of one electoral process, not independently the entire type of regime or all the events after February 2024.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report – 2023. Beograd: CRTA Election Observation Mission.

What the source records
CRTA estimates that the elections were not free and fair and recorded serious irregularities in 13% of the polling stations observed in the parliamentary and 21% in the Belgrade elections, with documented pressures, institutional passivity and organized migration of voters.
Claim it supports
CRTA’s parallel monitoring provides domestic data on the campaign, election day and protection of electoral law.
Source limitation
The finding refers to one election cycle and represents an expert assessment of the domestic observation mission, not a court ruling or independent classification of the entire regime.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
Monitoring finds that more than half of the time intended for political actors went to the president, who had 354 live television broadcasts and almost exclusively neutral or positive treatment.
Claim it supports
The systematic measurement of the media shows the advantage of the power that arises before the vote.
Source limitation
The sample includes the central news of five national TV stations, but does not measure all media, the entire program offer, the audience or the direct impact of such reporting on voting.
Open source ↗
S04

Domestic NGO ten-year monitoring synthesis - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2026. A Decade of Election Observation: Is Everything the Same, Worse, or Better? Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
“The synthesis concludes that the key electoral problems have not been solved and that many have deepened, with a ten-year deletion of the border between the state and the ruling party.
Claim it supports
The ten-year synthesis confirms that the problem is not limited to one election cycle.
Source limitation
It is a short institutional retrospective, not a new methodological report; the claims should be checked in the individual election reports on which the synthesis is based.
Open source ↗
S05

Domestic NGO campaign financing monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Povećanje nesrazmere među akterima, procena ukupne vrednosti kampanje i preliminarni izveštaji: monitoring izbora 2023. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija.

What the source records
Transparency Serbia in the 2023 campaign records the use of public resources, intensive official campaign, large financial disproportion and lack of timely reaction of supervisory authorities.
Claim it supports
Monitoring shows that equality of elections is determined even before the election day access to money, public function and effective supervision.
Source limitation
It is a preliminary and narrowly thematic report for a single campaign; part of the conclusions are estimates and arguments for doubts, not legally determined infringements.
Open source ↗
S06

Domestic investigative journalism a specific case - Verified 21.08.2026

Milosavljević, Ivana, Teodora Ćurčić i Vladimir Kostić. 2023. CINS Inside SNS’s Call Center: Hostess Agency, Vote Buying, and Millions in Cash. Beograd: CINS.

What the source records
CINS recorded the work of a large SNS col-centre, cash payments and job offer related to voting through covert direct observation, documents and interviews.
Claim it supports
The specific case supports the claim that freedom of choice also depends on the absence of vote buying, pressure and misuse of personal data.
Source limitation
The investigation documents one operation and serious doubts, but it is not a court epilogue or proof that the same practice is being carried out everywhere or that each participant knew the full purpose of the system.
Open source ↗
S07

Domestic investigative journalism database - Verified 21.08.2026

Ćurčić, Teodora. 2024. Party Funds Database: SNS, the Financially Strongest Political Party in Serbia. Beograd: CINS.

What the source records
CINS database on financial statements of 40 political actors monitors revenues and expenditures 2015-2023 and shows a very large long-term material advantage of SNS.
Claim it supports
The long-term base shows that the formal right of all lists to participate does not mean that they have approximately equal material opportunities to reach voters.
Source limitation
The data show reported finances and a large imbalance, but part of the difference is due to the election results and current rules, while unreported or illegal flows by definition are not fully visible in the database.
Open source ↗
S08

Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Burazer, Nikola. 2024. Serbia: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

What the source records
Nations in Transit monitors the electoral process together with the media, local democracy, judiciary and corruption, and notes the long-standing deterioration of electoral equality in Serbia.
Claim it supports
Multiannual monitoring confirms that democratic quality depends not only on the counting of votes, but also on the media, rights, supervision and the possibility of dismissal.
Source limitation
The assessments are expert and based on the thresholds of the organization; individual claims should be verified by primary and additional sources.
Open source ↗
S09

Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.

What the source records
The European Commission monitors the implementation of the recommendations of the ODIHR, the Parliament, the media, the judiciary and institutional protection and notes the persistent weaknesses of the electoral environment and accountability.
Claim it supports
The official international review confirms that democratic elections are assessed throughout the institutional path before and after the vote.
Source limitation
The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Open source ↗
S10

Official international election monitoring - Full official report reviewed

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 2024. Observation of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Serbia (17 December 2023). Doc. 15895.

What the source records
He observes the entire process and finds that despite a technically regulated voting day and political alternatives, pressures, media bias and systemic advantages have created unfair conditions.
Claim it supports
Directly substantiates the claim that election day is not enough: campaigning, information, resources, freedom of choice and legal remedies are important.
Source limitation
PACE participated in a joint international observation mission with ODIHR and other delegations, so this report is an additional institutional check, but it is not a fully independent event or dataset.
Open source ↗
S11

Official political and institutional document of the EU - Viewed adopted text and official explanation

European Parliament. 2024. Resolution of 8 February 2024 on the Situation in Serbia Following the Elections. P9_TA(2024)0075.

What the source records
Document the political assessment of irregularities, media inequality and insufficient institutional response after the elections.
Claim it supports
It adds the post-election part of the cycle: democracy requires investigation, legal remedies and sanctions, not just the publication of results.
Source limitation
The resolution is a political act of Parliament and relies largely on the findings of election observers; it is not a separate empirical observation mission or court decision.
Open source ↗
S12

Independent international monitoring of media pluralism - Viewed official country page and available full report

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), European University Institute. 2026. Media Pluralism Monitor 2026: Serbia.

What the source records
Finds a very high risk of political independence of the media and bias in local campaigns during 2025.
Claim it supports
Supports the information requirement of democratic elections and shows that the problem is not limited to the 2023 campaign.
Source limitation
It is a structured expert risk assessment that also uses local sources; it does not measure hypothetical election results without media bias or each newsroom individually.
Open source ↗
S13

Local media network local survey and field research - Full report and methodology reviewed

Cvejić, Bojan, i ANEM. 2026. Indikatori stanja lokalnih medija u Srbiji za 2025. godinu: studija slučaja osam gradova i opština i jednog regiona.

What the source records
Local journalists in several cities are seeing a deterioration in freedom, security and access to information, with political and economic pressures.
Claim it supports
Adds a local perspective on the conditions in which citizens receive information before and between elections.
Source limitation
The sample of journalists and selected environments are not representative of the whole of Serbia, and the evaluations express the experiences and assessments of the participants, not the rate of all incidents.
Open source ↗
S14

Domestic research organization systematic analysis of online media - Full report and methodology reviewed

Bajić, Mila, Snežana Bajčeta i SHARE Fondacija. 2024. Izbori 2023. na informativnoj margini: analiza predizborne kampanje u onlajn medijima.

What the source records
On 10,772 central online text it finds that only 17% of the content was about elections, analytics 7.8%, and debate framework 1%.
Claim it supports
Proves that the formal existence of elections is not enough if the most influential online space does not provide comparable information and argumentative debate.
Source limitation
Analyzes the most prominent positions of 15 portals and does not include all content, television, radio or behavior of all users; the sample has technical gaps for the first two days.
Open source ↗
S15

Local NGO comparative analysis of public media financing - Viewed full report and publicly available documentation described in methodology

Res Publika. 2025. Propaganda vs. javni interes: analiza projektnog finansiranja i medijskog pluralizma u lokalnim zajednicama.

What the source records
In five local communities, it documents how public funding can support promotional content and narrow local pluralism.
Claim it supports
It connects the electoral conditions with the infrastructure between the elections: who survives financially and what kind of content citizens get at the local level.
Source limitation
Five mediums and one competition cycle give strong local examples, but do not represent all local competitions or prove the motive of each commission or media.
Open source ↗
S16

Local NGO monitoring of local election campaign - View full report and official summary

Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Lider novog sveta: raspisuj lokalno, plaši globalno — monitoring lokalnih izbora 2. juna 2024.

What the source records
In 90 local units monitors the official campaign, media, public resources, financing and reactions of competent authorities during the 2024 elections.
Claim it supports
Expands evidence beyond one national cycle and shows why equality of choice is also measured through local use of function and resources.
Source limitation
It refers to a specific election cycle, observed officials and the media; it is not a list of every local activity or evidence that every official activity was an abuse.
Open source ↗
S17

Primary source official regulatory monitoring of media - Full official report, methodology and end tables

Regulatorno telo za elektronske medije (REM). 2025. Izbori 2023 — završni izveštaj monitoringa pružalaca medijskih usluga.

What the source records
Official regulatory data shows a high dominance of the list of authorities on commercial broadcasters and a high share of state officials in election media time.
Claim it supports
Gives primary evidence that the formal representation of all lists does not mean equal visibility and informational conditions.
Source limitation
The official regulator measures time and tonality according to its own methodology, and the full report is published with considerable delay; the data does not measure the immediate effect on voting and the conclusions of the regulator require comparison with other monitoring.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

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