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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
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AVTOKRATIJA›How democracy disappears step by step
08
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

Why does each institution become easier to weaken once the first one has been brought under control?

Confidence in the conclusionquite substantiated, with important conditions
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources15
Period201226

Institutions protect democracy as a connected system, not as separate islands. The media can detect abuse, the court can stop it, the assembly can ask for an explanation, the independent body collects data, and citizens and the opposition can turn the knowledge into political pressure.

When the government takes over or intimidates one of these institutions, they are left without an important source of information, support or a way for their decisions to be implemented. The next institution then pays a higher price if it opposes, because it knows it can remain alone. That is why taking control often accelerates itself. Still, the institution is not a protection just because it exists on paper: it needs people who can decide on their own, enough money and data, clear powers and public support when it comes under

Example from SerbiaChecked 15 sources; 13 manufacturers
15 related sources; 13 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 6

When parliament poorly examines the executive power, it becomes easier to implement appointments and laws without serious debate. When the media is unequal, it is harder for citizens to find out what is changed by these appointments and laws; when the prosecution and other controls are weak, the detected abuses are less likely to result. In Serbia, therefore, pressures on different institutions cannot be understood separately: weakening one leaves the other without information, support or execution of their decisions.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

The Open Parliament has poor oversight and accelerated procedures, legislative takeover studies follow the appointments of other bodies, and reports on the security sector and the rule of law show how control is passed on.

02 Our interpretation

“The institution is most vulnerable when it knows that if it opposes it will be left alone without media attention, parliamentary support, prosecutorial reaction or public pressure.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes the findings show interdependence, not a set of completely unrelated failures.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

The link between weaknesses is not always directly proven for every decision. Here we cross-reference sectoral findings and therefore clearly separate documented facts from the interpretation of their common effect.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The institution does not limit power just because it exists. It needs independent people, money, powers and the support of society.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

review more research

Ginsburg, T. i Huq, A. Z. (2018), How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, University of Chicago Press.

Contribution to this answer
Ginsburg and Huq show that the constitutional brakes are not automatic: if one institution weakens, the executive power gets more room to influence the next, because the mechanisms of mutual control rely on each other.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.

Contribution to this answer
Scheppele shows how one legal change can open the way for the following: rearrangement of appointments, procedures or jurisdictions changes who has the power to decide on the next institutional changes.
Open source ↗
A03

review more research

Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2021), Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Haggard and Kaufman show that the gradual character of setbacks makes a coordinated response difficult: when the cost of each individual move seems limited, opponents tend to unite in time.
Open source ↗
A04

Detailed analysis of one or several cases

Laebens, M. G. i Lührmann, A. (2021), „What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of Accountability“, Democratization 28(5): 908–928.

Contribution to this answer
Laebens and Lhrmann give an important reverse proof: erosion can be stopped when horizontal, diagonal and vertical responsibility reinforce each other. This shows why the loss of one control center is important to defend the others.
Open source ↗
A05

comparison of different combinations of conditions

Panzano, G. i Tomini, L. (2026), „Unity Makes Strength: Patterns of Democratic Resistance against Autocratization“, European Journal of Political Research, First View: 1–26.

Contribution to this answer
Panzano and Tomini show that democratic resistance works best through combinations of institutional, political, social and external pressure. When these sources of resistance are separated or weakened, the government is easier to continue the next step.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

What the source records
The paper claims that the control of parliament has enabled the further takeover of independent institutions and continued democratic backlash since 2012.
Claim it supports
Shows how parliamentary control opens the way for appointments and influence over other institutions.
Source limitation
Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
The report describes the Assembly under the dominant influence of the executive, with minimal use of oversight mechanisms, systematic ignoring of opposition initiatives and abuse of procedures.
Claim it supports
Document the weakening of one key link parliamentary oversight and public debate.
Source limitation
It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

What the source records
The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
Claim it supports
It shows how weak parliamentary and civilian control facilitates the political takeover of the security sector.
Source limitation
Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Open source ↗
S04

Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.

What the source records
The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
Claim it supports
It links findings on parliament, judiciary, independent bodies, media and civil society in the same period.
Source limitation
The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Open source ↗
S05

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 954–979. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065

What the source records
Beširević analyzes the politically sensitive cases of the Constitutional Court and finds that a formally independent court in key disputes often chooses caution and formalism.
Claim it supports
Historical analysis shows that formal independence is not enough if the court does not have the practice and institutional strength to effectively limit political power.
Source limitation
The analysis ends before the latest judicial reforms and relates primarily to the Constitutional Court, not to all courts and prosecutions.
Open source ↗
S06

Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821

What the source records
BCSP identifies legal and institutional “grey zones” and veto points in the security sector and proposes strengthening external controllers that have previously been left without sufficient power.
Claim it supports
The study directly shows that weak parliamentary, civil and other external controls facilitate the takeover of institutions that are left without mutual protection.
Source limitation
The work starts from the concept of the captured state and is aimed at security and recommendations for reform, so its framework should be read together with wider and methodologically different sources.
Open source ↗
S07

Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.

What the source records
prEUgovor simultaneously records the concentration of power, pressure on the judiciary, weak anti-corruption responsibility, control of the media and institutional abuses.
Claim it supports
“The multisectoral review confirms the conclusion that institutions do not weaken like isolated islands and that the absence of one control increases the burden on others.
Source limitation
It is the semi-annual report of the coalition with a clear reform and advocacy role, so its evaluations should be checked through the above examples, documents and sources for each area.
Open source ↗
S08

Domestic NGOs and research media case study - Verified 21.08.2026

Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.

What the source records
The study Transparency Serbia, CINS and Open Society European Policy Institute allocates seven mechanisms of political control of the judiciary, prosecution and police through 12 cases.
Claim it supports
Linking appointments, discretion, information and dysfunctional investigations shows how the weakness of one link facilitates the failure of the other.
Source limitation
Cases precede recent institutional changes and cannot prove that every action today is politically controlled, but they provide an important early point for monitoring continuity.
Open source ↗
S09

Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed

European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.

What the source records
At the same time, it connects weak parliamentary oversight, political pressures on the judiciary, REM problems and limited capacities of independent bodies.
Claim it supports
substantiates the claim of interdependence of controls: when more system guards weaken, each following has less institutional support.
Source limitation
The report serves to monitor European standards and relies on state, international and civil society inputs; it does not give scientific classification of the regime or independently check any submitted claim.
Open source ↗
S10

International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed

OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.

What the source records
Finds poor coordination of the centre of power, insufficient management responsibility and exceptions that bypass standard procedures.
Claim it supports
It shows that weak personnel, procedural and financial control can enable problems to be transmitted through multiple institutions.
Source limitation
The data mostly ends in mid-2024; the new methodology limits direct comparison of recent reports with older cycles, and part of the findings uses administration data and interviews.
Open source ↗
S11

Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026

European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.

What the source records
Monitor the long-term normalization of acting officials at the top of the state administration.
Claim it supports
Provides a specific personnel mechanism through which one weakened appointment control can reduce the willingness of other parts of the administration to refuse pressure.
Source limitation
Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Open source ↗
S12

Domestic NGOs institutional and judicial monitoring - Full report and methodology reviewed

Mandić, Sofija, i CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council: 2025.

What the source records
Shows that unavailable materials, incomplete records and poor communication reduce the public’s ability to monitor judicial councils.
Claim it supports
It supports the link between transparency and real external control over institutions that choose and protect judges and prosecutors.
Source limitation
Analysis primarily measures transparency based on publicly available data; it does not prove the political influence in every decision or the quality of each appointment.
Open source ↗
S13

Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables

Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.

What the source records
It shows that a part of the body does not act even after the mandatory decision of the Commissioner, especially public companies.
Claim it supports
Gives a direct example of how the weak response of executive and public authorities diminishes the effect of an independent control institution.
Source limitation
The report measures the cases that have reached the Commissioner and the conduct within his competence; it does not cover all the requirements in the country or determine the political motive of non-compliance.
Open source ↗
S14

Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables

Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije. 2026. Redovan godišnji izveštaj Zaštitnika građana za 2025. godinu.

What the source records
The high rate of follow-up shows that the support of other authorities to an independent institution can maintain its practical effect.
Claim it supports
It serves as an important countercheck: interdependence can work in a positive direction, so weakening is not automatic or irreversible.
Source limitation
Data refer to the subject matter of the Protector and his own system of records; the high rate of conduct does not measure the quality of each response or the state of all control institutions.
Open source ↗
S15

Primary source annual report of the state anti-corruption body - Viewed full official report and tables

Agencija za sprečavanje korupcije Republike Srbije. 2026. Annual Report 2025.

What the source records
Local plans without a monitoring body show that one link of control can exist without the next necessary link of enforcement.
Claim it supports
Supports the mechanism of interdependence at the local level: the plan without a supervisory body has significantly weaker corrective capacity.
Source limitation
It is an independent report of the body on its own work; the data show institutional scope and gaps, but do not represent an independent assessment of the effectiveness of each plan or decision.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

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