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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
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AVTOKRATIJA›Why the police, military, and security services obey
18
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

Why do those in power maintain several services that monitor citizens and one another?

Confidence in the conclusionquite substantiated, with important conditions
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources9
Period201226

The government makes more services because it does not want an organization to have all the power and all the confidential information in its hands. When the police, the military, intelligence services and special units have overlapping jobs, they can monitor the citizens, but also report to each other. The leader thus gets more data sources and reduces the possibility of one command peak becoming independent.

Still, the rivalry produces serious weaknesses: the services can exaggerate threats, hide failures, duplicate business or plant competitors in order to preserve their position and budget. The number of services does not prove anything. It is important who appoints their managers, to whom they report directly, whether their competencies are deliberately overlapping and whether the law can even check their work.

Example from SerbiaChecked 9 sources; 8 manufacturers
9 related sources; 8 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 3

Serbia has police, BIA, military services and other authorities with different databases and powers. The problem is not only that they monitor citizens, but that through overlap and political coordination they can also monitor each other, thereby gaining more sources of information and easier to detect disloyalty. Without independent control, the same system that should prevent abuse can become a way to hide it.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

BCSP describes unclear links and weak parliamentary scrutiny, while Amnesty and SHARE document or legally analyze the use of digital tools by activists and journalists.

02 Our interpretation

Multiple services allow the leader to compare reports and reduce dependence on one apparatus, but it makes it difficult for the citizen to find out who accessed his data and at whose order.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes to the mechanism of overlap and supervisory risk; not as evidence that each service is constantly used for political monitoring.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Legal security supervision may be necessary in criminal and counterintelligence work. The key difference is a court order, the exact purpose, access records and the possibility of independent control.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The number of services does not indicate who controls them. You need to know who orders them, who pays for them and who can speak directly to the leader.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

comparing several countries or cases

Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Greitens shows why regimes divide the coercive apparatus into multiple services and build special intelligence capacities: different institutions can track citizens, but also each other, reducing the risk of one organization becoming an independent threat.
Open source ↗
A02

data from a large number of countries

De Bruin, E. (2020), How to Prevent Coups d’État, Cornell University Press.

Contribution to this answer
De Bruin shows how parallel armed organizations reduce the possibility of one service monopolizing the force and carrying out a coup. Mutual competition increases the security of the leader, but can weaken coordination.
Open source ↗
A03

comparing several countries or cases

Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), „Coup-Proofing“, International Security 24(2): 131–165.

Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), "Coup-Proofing", International Security 24(2): 131–165.

Contribution to this answer
Quinlivan describes parallel forces and mutual monitoring as classic techniques of preventing coup. The regime thus supervises not only society but also its own apparatus of force.
Open source ↗
A04

review more research

Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Wintrobe explains why such mutual monitoring is attractive to the dictator: he never has complete information about the loyalty of his associates, so he builds systems that reduce the possibility of clandestine association against him.
Open source ↗
A05

data from a large number of countries

Timoneda, J. C., Escribà-Folch, A. i Chin, J. (2023), „The Rush to Personalize“, British Journal of Political Science 53(3): 878–901.

Contribution to this answer
Timoneda, Escrib-Folch and Chin study how failed coups can accelerate the personalization of power and changes in the leader’s attitude to the apparatus of force. The work is useful for the consequences of the fear of a coup, but it is more indirect for the question of multiple services that accompany each other.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

What the source records
The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
Claim it supports
Describes the relations between police, services and defence and the difficulty to clearly establish political and institutional responsibility.
Source limitation
Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Open source ↗
S02

International Organization for Human Rights Forensic Research - Verified 21.08.2026

Amnesty International. 2024. A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the Suppression of Civil Society in Serbia. London: Amnesty International.

What the source records
The report documents cases of unlocking phones and installing spyware during police or security conversations, as well as consequences for civil society.
Claim it supports
Forensic documents analyzed cases of digital surveillance towards activists and journalists.
Source limitation
Forensic findings are strong for the analyzed devices, but the number of cases is not a measure of distribution in the entire population; the authorities have disputed the allegations of illegal work.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic NGOs legal analysis of digital surveillance - Verified 21.08.2026

SHARE Foundation. 2026. Digital Forensics Tools: Legal Framework Analysis — Serbia. Belgrade: SHARE Foundation.

What the source records
The analysis concludes that Serbian law does not provide grounds for the use of digital forensic tools outside the criminal proceedings or without a court order.
Claim it supports
Establishes legal limits on the use of forensic tools and the need for a court order.
Source limitation
Legal analysis determines what is allowed, and it can not prove on its own who in each individual case ordered or conducted illegal surveillance.
Open source ↗
S04

University laboratory technical research - Verified 21.08.2026

Citizen Lab. 2021. Pegasus vs. Predator: Dissident’s Doubly-Infected iPhone Reveals Cytrox Mercenary Spyware. Toronto: Munk School, University of Toronto.

What the source records
Scans have listed Serbia among the likely users of Predator infrastructure, showing the international market of tools that give countries secret surveillance capabilities.
Claim it supports
Shows the international market of secret tools and indications of infrastructure associated with Serbia, with an important restriction of attribution.
Source limitation
The network infrastructure indicates a likely user, but it does not prove itself who used the tool in Serbia, against whom and with what legal basis.
Open source ↗
S05

Domestic think tank multisectoral research report - Review full report, methodology framework and chapters by sectors

Petrović, Predrag, i Jelena Pejić Nikić, ur. 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

What the source records
Describes the parallel activities of civil and military services, the secret surveillance of critics and the transfer of information to political and media channels.
Claim it supports
Supports that multiple services produce data on both citizens and other organised actors, while unclear supervision increases the risk of abuse.
Source limitation
The report starts from the framework of the captured state, combines cases and secondary sources and does not constitute a court decision for each allegation; the same manufacturer already has other reports in the matrix.
Open source ↗
S06

Official international contractual monitoring of human rights - Viewed full adopted document, especially points 2627 and 4043

United Nations Human Rights Committee. 2024. Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Serbia. CCPR/C/SRB/CO/4, 3 May 2024.

What the source records
The UN Committee calls for clear legal guarantees, independent monitoring and investigations of data breaches throughout the surveillance regime, including online surveillance.
Claim it supports
Sets an immediate boundary between legitimate security work and a system in which data can be used without effective external control.
Source limitation
The Contracting Authority assesses the state data and alternative reports at the system level; it is not an immediate investigation commission for each incident, nor does it turn every claim into a judicially established fact.
Open source ↗
S07

Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed

European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.

What the source records
Record limited capacities of independent bodies and poor parliamentary oversight.
Claim it supports
Confirms that the number of services is not the main test; it is crucial that different controls have the resources and authority to check their work.
Source limitation
The report serves to monitor European standards and relies on state, international and civil society inputs; it does not give scientific classification of the regime or independently check any submitted claim.
Open source ↗
S08

Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables

Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.

What the source records
Primary data shows a large volume of complaints about unavailable information and part of unexecuted decisions, with jurisdiction and data protection.
Claim it supports
Adds domestic institutional proof that the supervision of services also depends on whether an independent controller can obtain information and force the authorities to act.
Source limitation
The report measures the cases that have reached the Commissioner and the conduct within his competence; it does not cover all the requirements in the country or determine the political motive of non-compliance.
Open source ↗
S09

Reviewed review paper domestic institutional analysis - Viewed full work, method, findings and bibliographic record

Mitrović, Sava, i Milica Škorić. 2022. „Reforma sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji: dometi i ograničenja demokratskog upravljanja policijom.” Politička revija 73(3): 143–165. https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.7332022.7

What the source records
Finds insufficient parliamentary, independent and internal control and insufficient proactive transparency of the police.
Claim it supports
Supports the criterion that separates the legitimate specialization of multiple services from political risk: whether there is real, multiple and informed supervision of their work.
Source limitation
Review work synthesizes regulations, official documents, requests for information and secondary literature; it does not bring a new representative survey or directly examines the motives of police elders.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

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