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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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AVTOKRATIJA›How law, courts, and parliament are used
31
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

How can those in power change the system through laws and apparently proper procedures?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources10
Period201226

The system can be changed with an orderly number of votes in the assembly, a formal public hearing and a decision of the constitutional court.

The problem arises when a series of seemingly legal changes are used to permanently make the government more difficult to control and replace: it changes the way judges and supervisors choose, narrows access to information, weakens opposition rights or rearranges election rules to its advantage. Each step can have an acceptable rationale, while their joint effect becomes authoritarian. Therefore, the legality of the procedure is not the same as the political purpose and consequences. It is necessary to look at the speed, the quality of the debate, the possibility of independent control of the government.

Example from SerbiaChecked 10 sources; 10 manufacturers
10 related sources; 10 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 7

In Serbia, political power is often spread through formal legal steps: accelerated parliamentary procedure, changes of rules, selection of members of supervisory bodies, special laws for individual projects or long-term appointment of acting officials. Each step has a member of the law and a vote, but the sum can reduce public debate, independence and the possibility of control. The law is thus not abolished it is used to give the new distribution of power an official form.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

Scientific analysis of the legislative takeover and monitoring of the Open Parliament, Transparency Serbia and CEP document procedures, appointments and exceptions that move control to the executive branch. Passivation of addresses in the Presevo Valley gives a concrete case in which the technical administrative procedure, often without properly submitted decision, produces consequences for documents, work, property and voting rights.

02 Our interpretation

The question is not only whether the procedure was formally complied with, but who could participate, whether there was a real debate and what lasting effect the rule has on the balance of power.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes Serbian sources provide more concrete channels of authoritarian legalism.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Accelerated procedure, special law or acting person can have a justified reason. Authoritarian form occurs when exceptions are repeated, serve the same center of power and do not have effective control.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

Not every constitutional change should be declared an abuse. Content, speed, public debate and whether the government will lose elections in the future are important.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

comparing several countries or cases

Landau, D. (2013), „Abusive Constitutionalism“, UC Davis Law Review 47: 189–260.

Landau, D. (2013), "Abusive Constitutionalism", UC Davis Law Review 47: 189–260.

Contribution to this answer
Landau shows how democracy can be weakened by a completely ‘legal’ path through constitutional changes that formally respect the procedure, and essentially remove the brakes on the executive.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.

Contribution to this answer
Scheppele shows how a series of technical changes to laws, appointments and jurisdictions can reshuffle institutions for the benefit of the government without the open abolition of a democratic constitution.
Open source ↗
A03

comparing several countries or cases

Varol, O. O. (2015), „Stealth Authoritarianism“, Iowa Law Review 100: 1673–1742.

Contribution to this answer
Varrol shows how the government can use normal legal instruments lawsuits, election regulations, media and other rules to secretly increase the price of political competition and protect itself from dismissal.
Open source ↗
A04

review more research

Ginsburg, T. i Huq, A. Z. (2018), How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, University of Chicago Press.

Contribution to this answer
Ginsburg and Huq show that the constitution itself is not a protection: the way powers are distributed can either slow down democratic erosion or give it a legal form.
Open source ↗
A05

review more research

Bermeo, N. (2016), „On Democratic Backsliding“, Journal of Democracy 27(1): 5–19.

Contribution to this answer
Bermeo shows that the gradual expansion of executive power and strategic electoral manipulation have become typical modern ways of backsliding, often without an open coup or the abolition of the constitution.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

What the source records
The paper claims that the control of parliament has enabled the further takeover of independent institutions and continued democratic backlash since 2012.
Claim it supports
The claim that the distribution of power can be changed by formal laws, appointments and exceptions, the sum of which weakens debate and control.
Source limitation
Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
The report describes the Assembly under the dominant influence of the executive, with minimal use of oversight mechanisms, systematic ignoring of opposition initiatives and abuse of procedures.
Claim it supports
The claim that the distribution of power can be changed by formal laws, appointments and exceptions, the sum of which weakens debate and control.
Source limitation
It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026

European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.

What the source records
At the end of 2021, officials accounted for 52% of the highest official positions, so temporary appointments became a common way of retaining political control.
Claim it supports
The claim that the distribution of power can be changed by formal laws, appointments and exceptions, the sum of which weakens debate and control.
Source limitation
Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Open source ↗
S04

Domestic NGOs anti-corruption parallel report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đorđević, Miloš, i Nemanja Nenadić. 2023. Civil Society Report on the Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Serbia. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija i UNCAC Coalition.

What the source records
Based on regulations, organ reports, eight requests for access to information, consultations and documented cases, the authors find a broad formal framework, but a significantly larger problem in the ineffective or selective application of the rules.
Claim it supports
The claim that the distribution of power can be changed by formal laws, appointments and exceptions, the sum of which weakens debate and control.
Source limitation
The report is thematically related to UNCAC and ends in mid-2023, so it does not specify the type of regime or cover later development and all forms of political control.
Open source ↗
S05

Local NGO and local partner field research - Verified 21.08.2026

Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava i Odbor za ljudska prava Bujanovac. 2023. Pasivizacija adresa Albanaca u Preševskoj dolini kao diskriminatorna praksa. Beograd i Bujanovac: YIHR Srbija i Odbor za ljudska prava Bujanovac.

What the source records
Documents how the formal procedure of checking the residence, often without a duly submitted decision, produces consequences for several civil rights.
Claim it supports
Provides a clear case of changing the actual system using a seemingly technical administrative procedure.
Source limitation
The dedicated sample and incomplete administrative availability do not allow for the assessment of all passivated addresses; the report documents the affected cases and the pattern, not each individual procedure.
Open source ↗
S06

Official international legal opinion - Reviewed officially adopted opinion, findings and recommendations

Venice Commission. 2026. Urgent Opinion on the 28 January 2026 Amendments to Laws Governing the Judiciary and the Prosecution. CDL-AD(2026)016.

What the source records
Evaluates the procedure and the aggregate effect of the five judicial laws passed urgently on 28 January 2026, without effective discussion, consultation and impact assessment.
Claim it supports
Directly supports that formal voting and legislative procedure can change institutional guarantees without real public control.
Source limitation
Legal opinion on a certain package of laws; multiple reports on the same event are no longer independent certificates, and part of the recommendations were subsequently reviewed or implemented.
Open source ↗
S07

Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - The official chapter for Serbia, findings, recommendations and methodological limitations

European Commission. 2026. 2026 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2026) 931 final.

What the source records
Follow January’s judicial changes, the manner of adoption, subsequent repairs and a brief parliamentary procedure in the wider rule of law system.
Claim it supports
Supports that both the procedure and the cumulative consequences should be observed, and not just the formal majority in the Assembly.
Source limitation
EU monitoring that combines data from authorities and actors; the same manufacturer as previous reports of the European Commission and therefore does not count as a new independent group when used together.
Open source ↗
S08

Domestic coalition of civil society and professional organizations reaction to the legislative procedure - Viewed original statement, date, process remarks and request

Radna grupa Nacionalnog konventa o Evropskoj uniji za Poglavlje 23. 2026. Saopštenje povodom postupka izmene pravosudnih zakona. 6. maj 2026.

What the source records
The domestic expert coalition documents short deadlines, unpublished drafts and weak conditions for participation in consultations on judicial laws.
Claim it supports
Supports the concrete claim that a formal public debate is not enough if the actors do not have the time and text for actual participation.
Source limitation
Public advocacy statement of the expert coalition, not independent assessment of consequences; it overlaps with CEPRIS/YUCOM networks and the same legislative event.
Open source ↗
S09

Primary source official statement of the Judicial Council - Viewed original statement of the High Judicial Council

Visoki savet sudstva. 2026. Saopštenje povodom Predloga izmena pravosudnih zakona. 15. januar 2026.

What the source records
The High Judicial Council publicly states that its opinion has not been requested and that it lacks load analysis.
Claim it supports
Primarily confirms that the competent institution has challenged the procedure despite the formally correct legislative course.
Source limitation
The official position of the institution directly affected by the proposal; confirms its conduct and procedural objection, does not constitute an external assessment of the entire package.
Open source ↗
S10

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Ugarković, Uroš. 2023. “What Is Parliamentarism to Populists? The Populist Redefinition of the Concept of Parliamentarism in Parliamentary Debates in Post-Milošević Serbia.” Redescriptions 26(2): 160–175. https://doi.org/10.33134/rds.403

What the source records
Analyzes how parliamentary procedures and the very notion of parliamentarism are transformed in political speech in Serbia.
Claim it supports
Adds an academic framework to distinguish between the formal use of parliament and its democratic control purpose.
Source limitation
Analyzing speech and congregational practices, it does not measure the whole regime or all the centers of power.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

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AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

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04

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