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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
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AVTOKRATIJA›How law, courts, and parliament are used
32
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

Why does an authoritarian government need a constitution, courts, and parliament?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources8
Period200626

Authoritarian authorities need a constitution, courts and assembly because they cannot make every decision personally and by force. These institutions resolve everyday disputes, regulate business and inheritance, turn political agreements into general rules and give citizens and companies some predictability.

Parliament can include important groups in the division of benefits, and the court can enforce contracts and discipline lower officials. At the same time, the formal procedure of the government gives the appearance of order and legality. Therefore, the institution in the authoritarian system is not necessarily empty, but its real limit becomes visible when the case hits the top of the government. The question is not only whether the court or assembly works, but whether they can make and implement a decision that the authorities do not seriously answer.

Example from SerbiaChecked 8 sources; 8 manufacturers
8 related sources; 8 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 5

Authoritarian authorities in Serbia need the Constitution, the courts and the assembly because through them decisions get the appearance of a general rule, not personal orders. The Assembly adopts budgets and appointments, the courts resolve disputes and punish, and the Constitution confirms the legitimacy of the order. When these institutions mostly follow the executive power, they do not disappear they become channels through which political decision gets legal force and international acceptability.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

The Constitution formally divides power, while studies on parliament and the Constitutional Court record presidentialization, poor government control, and the caution of courts in key political disputes.

02 Our interpretation

Institutions are more useful than open arbitrariness because they enable predictable management, distribution of jobs and the claim that everything is done according to the law.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes the gap between the constitutional text and the practice is well supported.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Institutions are not completely empty: sometimes they make decisions against the authorities and citizens can use them. The claim refers to a dominant pattern and limited control power, not every judgment or session.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The very existence of a court or assembly does not say what they really serve. One should look at when the authorities help, when they resolve the conflict, and when they really stop it.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

comparing several countries or cases

Gandhi, J. (2008), Political Institutions under Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Gandhi shows that authoritarian institutions serve the practical needs of the regime: through parliaments, parties and other channels, the government receives information, negotiates with groups and shares concessions that it cannot completely ignore.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Gandhi, J. i Przeworski, A. (2007), „Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats“, Comparative Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301.

Contribution to this answer
Gandhi and Przeworski show that dictators use political institutions to co-opt the opposition and make controlled agreements. The institution can therefore be useful to the regime even when it does not restrict power in a democratic way.
Open source ↗
A03

Historical data and comparison

Moustafa, T. (2007), The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Moustafa in Egypt shows why the authoritarian regime can want courts with real but limited autonomy: it needs them for economy, administrative disputes and legitimacy, even when it doesn’t want to let the courts jeopardize the political leadership.
Open source ↗
A04

comparing several countries or cases

Ginsburg, T. i Moustafa, T. (ur.) (2008), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Ginsburg and Moustafa show that autocracy courts can resolve real disputes at the same time, support governance and legitimacy, and sometimes open up a space for legal resistance that the regime has not fully controlled.
Open source ↗
A05

comparing several countries or cases

Ginsburg, T. i Simpser, A. (ur.) (2014), Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Ginsburg and Simpser show that constitutions in autocracy can coordinate elites, signal rules, organize power and provide legitimacy. The constitution can therefore be politically useful and a government that does not respect it democratically.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Primary legal source - Verified 21.08.2026

Republika Srbija. 2006. Ustav Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik RS 98/2006, engleski prevod Narodne skupštine.

What the source records
The Constitution bases the system on balance and mutual control of power; the President expresses state unity, while the Government exercises executive and the Assembly exercises constitutional and legislative power.
Claim it supports
The claim that the constitution, courts and assembly give legal force and legitimacy to decisions, even when their ability to limit executive power is weak.
Source limitation
The Constitution says that power should be distributed, but it does not show how powers are used in practice.
Open source ↗
S02

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17

What the source records
"The paper links presidencialization with the immediate election of the president, weaknesses in constitutional design, proportional elections and oligarchic parties.
Claim it supports
The claim that the constitution, courts and assembly give legal force and legitimacy to decisions, even when their ability to limit executive power is weak.
Source limitation
It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Open source ↗
S03

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 954–979. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065

What the source records
The paper finds that the Court often chose caution and formalism in key disputes, so it did not become a strong defence of political power, even though it was formally independent.
Claim it supports
The claim that the constitution, courts and assembly give legal force and legitimacy to decisions, even when their ability to limit executive power is weak.
Source limitation
The analysis ends before the latest judicial reforms and relates primarily to the Constitutional Court, not to all courts and prosecutions.
Open source ↗
S04

Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
The report describes the Assembly under the dominant influence of the executive, with minimal use of oversight mechanisms, systematic ignoring of opposition initiatives and abuse of procedures.
Claim it supports
The claim that the constitution, courts and assembly give legal force and legitimacy to decisions, even when their ability to limit executive power is weak.
Source limitation
It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Open source ↗
S05

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

What the source records
It shows how a legislative institution can keep form and make rules while being caught by a dominant presidential leadership.
Claim it supports
Supports the claim that institutions are not empty: they turn political decisions into generally applicable legal form and give them procedural authority.
Source limitation
Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Open source ↗
S06

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Ugarković, Uroš. 2023. “What Is Parliamentarism to Populists? The Populist Redefinition of the Concept of Parliamentarism in Parliamentary Debates in Post-Milošević Serbia.” Redescriptions 26(2): 160–175. https://doi.org/10.33134/rds.403

What the source records
Monitor how the government and the opposition use parliamentary debates and the idea of parliamentarism to legitimize their positions.
Claim it supports
It supports the legitimacy and communication function of parliament even when its control power is weakened.
Source limitation
Analyzing speech and congregational practices, it does not measure the whole regime or all the centers of power.
Open source ↗
S07

International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

What the source records
The wider stability of the regime is associated with formal institutions, elections and rules that continue to organize political and social action.
Claim it supports
Adds an independent systematic assessment that the constitution, courts and assembly continue to perform real functions in a weakened democratic order.
Source limitation
It is a periodic expert assessment with its own methodology, not a peer-reviewed work that isolates a single cause.
Open source ↗
S08

Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - The official chapter for Serbia, findings, recommendations and methodological limitations

European Commission. 2026. 2026 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2026) 931 final.

What the source records
In the same chapter, it assesses the judiciary, parliament, anti-corruption and independent bodies, including their real capacities and weaknesses.
Claim it supports
Supports that formal institutions handle affairs and produce decisions, but that their borders are seen in the supervision of politically sensitive issues.
Source limitation
EU monitoring that combines data from authorities and actors; the same manufacturer as previous reports of the European Commission and therefore does not count as a new independent group when used together.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

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AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

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