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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

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Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

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Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

AVTOKRATIJA›Who really rules and what happens after the leader
11
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

Which people and groups does political power really rest on?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources11
Period201226

Authoritarian power usually rests on a circle of people and groups without which the leader cannot make and implement decisions. These can be the top parties, police and security services, military commanders, businessmen, administration, media owners and local mediators.

Each of them gives something that the authorities need force, money, information, organization or votes and in turn expects position, protection, access to jobs or security. The leader therefore does not have to just control the citizens; he must constantly prevent and conflict or association of people within his own circle. The true support of the authorities is not always seen from official functions. The most important thing is who can stop the decision, withhold the resource or move other people, and not only whose name stands at the top of the institution.

Example from SerbiaChecked 11 sources; 10 manufacturers
11 related sources; 10 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 2

Power in Serbia does not rest only on the president or ministers. It relies on the top of the ruling party, people who control the parliamentary majority and appointments, managers of public companies and administrations, local party networks, as well as parts of the security apparatus and business circles that depend on state decisions. The system survives while key actors believe that their power is safer than outside it.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

Studies on Parliament, Clientelism, Public Enterprises and the Security Sector describe different decision-making groups, allocate resources and maintain political discipline.

02 Our interpretation

“The real question is not just who is most visible, but who can lose office, contract, protection or access to resources if they stop cooperating and who can threaten the government in return.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes sources show a wider coalition of supporters, not the power of one person without intermediaries.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Not all party members, officials, police officers or businessmen are part of the same network nor act for the same reason. Sources describe the structures of incentives and documented connections, not the collective guilt of entire professions.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The real circle of power is often hidden and variable. A high function does not always mean the real power to stop the decision.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

comparing several countries or cases

Svolik, M. W. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Svolik shows that a leader only survives if he simultaneously controls society and keeps the agreement with the elites who give him money, organization, information or force. Authoritarian power is therefore a coalition, not just one man.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Boix, C. i Svolik, M. W. (2013), „The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government“, Journal of Politics 75(2): 300–316.

Contribution to this answer
Boix and Svolik show why authoritarian institutions can help divide power: when allies have enough strength to punish a leader, formal rules allow them to monitor whether he respects the deal and to reduce their fear of betrayal.
Open source ↗
A03

review more research

Meng, A., Paine, J. i Powell, R. (2023), „Authoritarian Power Sharing“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.

Contribution to this answer
“Meng, Paine and Powell show that real power sharing requires more than shared functions and benefits mechanisms are needed by which allies can enforce a deal and limit a leader.
Open source ↗
A04

comparing several countries or cases

Gandhi, J. i Przeworski, A. (2007), „Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats“, Comparative Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301.

Contribution to this answer
Gandhi and Przeworski show why dictators include part of the opposition in institutions: parliaments and parties can help co-opponents, offer concessions and reduce the risk of open conflict.
Open source ↗
A05

review more research

Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Wintrobe explains why the dictator combines rewards and repression: he doesn’t know for sure who is truly loyal to him, so he uses rents to buy support and fear to increase the price of betrayal.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C

What the source records
The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
Claim it supports
Describes clientelistic links between party leadership, economy, public sector and voters.
Source limitation
It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Open source ↗
S02

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

What the source records
The paper claims that the control of parliament has enabled the further takeover of independent institutions and continued democratic backlash since 2012.
Claim it supports
Shows the role of parliamentary majority and appointment in transferring power through the system.
Source limitation
Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic NGOs analysis of public companies - Verified 21.08.2026

Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Public Enterprises — A Symbol of Abuses and Violation of the Law. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.

What the source records
The analysis describes the long-term circumvention of competition for directors, political ties in governance, poor transparency and risks of using public resources for party needs.
Claim it supports
Document political risks in the management of public enterprises and the appointment of directors.
Source limitation
Anti-corruption analysis identifies risks and documented irregularities, but does not prove the criminal responsibility of every manager or company.
Open source ↗
S04

Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

What the source records
The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
Claim it supports
It shows why parts of the security sector are an important pillar of political control.
Source limitation
Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Open source ↗
S05

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349

What the source records
A 2024 survey shows that political exchange of services and coercion intertwine and differ according to employment, local competition and social position.
Claim it supports
substantiates that the power also rests on the intermediaries that connect the workplace, local resources and political mobilization, not only on the formal top.
Source limitation
Measures of experience and observation in one year; cannot verify each reported practice as a single legal case.
Open source ↗
S06

Reviewed scientific paper quantitative study of the network - Viewed full work, method, tables and bibliographic record

Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015.” Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3

What the source records
In one city board there are 1,725 members, their network positions, secured votes and 341 patronage jobs.
Claim it supports
Provides micro-evidence that local party activists and network intermediaries can be the backbone of the government in the exchange of votes, work and public employment.
Source limitation
An anonymised city board and 2015 data do not represent the whole party, all cities or the current situation; records are retrospective and do not establish the legality of every employment.
Open source ↗
S07

Reviewed scientific paper municipal panel and political data - View full work and bibliographic record

Dragojević, Mila, and Andy Konitzer. 2013. “The Forensics of Patronage: Identifying the Linkage Between Parties and Public Sector Employment in Serbia.” Sociološki pregled 47(1): 3–22.

What the source records
More than 165 municipalities associate the composition of local coalitions with employment in public enterprises.
Claim it supports
Supports the role of local parties, coalition partners and public companies in the wider range of resources on which the government rests.
Source limitation
Data precede the current government and measures aggregate connectivity, not the motive or responsibility of the individual; local coalitions and the labour market changed after 2009.
Open source ↗
S08

peer-reviewed scientific paper comparative case studies - Viewed full text and bibliographic record

Tomić, Slobodan, and Dušan Pavlović. 2023. “Blatant, Not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 16(1): 181–209. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008

What the source records
Through the NBS, the anti-corruption agency and EPS reconstructs how high appointments serve political control, resources and clientelism.
Claim it supports
It shows why the leaders of key institutions and public systems are an important part of the coalition of government supporters.
Source limitation
The three deliberately selected cases do not represent all high appointments; the patronage function and consequences are reconstructed by the authors from documents and publicly available data.
Open source ↗
S09

Domestic think tank multisectoral research report - Review full report, methodology framework and chapters by sectors

Petrović, Predrag, i Jelena Pejić Nikić, ur. 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

What the source records
Connects the top of the governing structure, services, police, defense, parliament and business interests through multiple documented cases.
Claim it supports
Complements the support map to security and business actors who can provide force, information and protection of resources.
Source limitation
The report starts from the framework of the captured state, combines cases and secondary sources and does not constitute a court decision for each allegation; the same manufacturer already has other reports in the matrix.
Open source ↗
S10

International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed

OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.

What the source records
The administration observes through the political management of reform, the acting authorities, accountability and public finances.
Claim it supports
Supports the claim that the political leadership and senior officials transmit political power through formal administrative positions.
Source limitation
The data mostly ends in mid-2024; the new methodology limits direct comparison of recent reports with older cycles, and part of the findings uses administration data and interviews.
Open source ↗
S11

International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

What the source records
Describes the dominance of the president and the SNS over the government, parliament, judiciary and governance.
Claim it supports
Adds a comparative expert confirmation that the pillars of power include several institutions and a party organization.
Source limitation
It is a periodic expert assessment with its own methodology, not a peer-reviewed work that isolates a single cause.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

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