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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

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AVTOKRATIJA›Who really rules and what happens after the leader
12
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

How does a leader share power with those around them, and why are rules necessary?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources11
Period201226

The leader needs rules because his co-workers can never be completely sure that he will not lose his position, property or freedom tomorrow. Agree on who gets what function, how it is advanced, how benefits are shared and who participates in important decisions reduce this fear and make cooperation more predictable.

The party, parliament, council or constitution can therefore play a real role in the authoritarian system: they do not have to protect citizens, but they can regulate relations among the people in power. Such a division of power lasts only if there are groups behind the rules that can punish the leader when he violates them. If they can not, the institution becomes an ornament, and loyalty depends on personal grace. Therefore, one should ask not only if there is a rule, but who can enforce it against the most powerful man.

Example from SerbiaChecked 11 sources; 11 manufacturers
11 related sources; 11 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 2

The leader cannot personally run every municipality, public company, committee or service, so he needs a division of affairs and reliable rules within the governing network. In Serbia, this division is seen through the party hierarchy, control of the parliamentary group, acting and local mediators who implement decisions and return information to the top. The rules are not just laws: they are important and unwritten expectations about loyalty, reward and punishment.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

Research by parliament, acting officials and clientelistic networks shows how formal appointments and informal ties distribute power across multiple levels.

02 Our interpretation

The leader shares tasks, access and benefits, but tries to keep the last word. Such a system can be very centralized even though a large number of intermediaries participate in it.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes Serbian sources show an organized division of power under a strong political center.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Evidence of unwritten rules often comes from interviews, appointment forms and behavior, so it is more difficult to determine the exact content of the agreement than with the published law.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The same institution can sometimes limit the leader, and sometimes it is just a decoration. It is important who has enough strength behind it to enforce the rule.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

comparing several countries or cases

Gandhi, J. i Przeworski, A. (2007), „Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats“, Comparative Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301.

Contribution to this answer
Gandhi and Przeworski show that parliaments and parties can be useful to the dictator because through them he negotiates with opponents, offers concessions and co-opts groups that might otherwise threaten him.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Gandhi, J. (2008), Political Institutions under Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Gandhi shows that authoritarian institutions are not just decorations: dictators use them to gather information about society’s demands, share benefits, and make controlled deals with groups they can’t simply ignore.
Open source ↗
A03

comparing several countries or cases

Boix, C. i Svolik, M. W. (2013), „The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government“, Journal of Politics 75(2): 300–316.

Contribution to this answer
Boix and Svolik explain why power-sharing rules can stabilize autocracy when the leader’s allies have enough power to punish him. Institutions then help everyone to monitor whether the agreement is respected.
Open source ↗
A04

comparing several countries or cases

Magaloni, B. (2008), „Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule“, Comparative Political Studies 41(4–5): 715–741.

Contribution to this answer
Magaloni shows how the dominant party can turn the distribution of positions and resources into a convincing agreement among the elites: staying in the party gives the expected future benefit, while going out carries political risk.
Open source ↗
A05

review more research

Hassan, M., Mattingly, D. i Nugent, E. R. (2022), „Political Control“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 155–174.

Contribution to this answer
Hassan shows that autocrats use a wider repertoire of personnel, administrative and political techniques to control the state and their associates. For a specific mechanism of formal power sharing, this work is wider than the first four.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C

What the source records
The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
Claim it supports
The paper explains the informal rules of exchange and mediation within a broad clientelistic network.
Source limitation
It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Open source ↗
S02

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17

What the source records
"The paper links presidencialization with the immediate election of the president, weaknesses in constitutional design, proportional elections and oligarchic parties.
Claim it supports
Shows how party organization and constitutional design facilitate centralization of decisions.
Source limitation
It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026

European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.

What the source records
At the end of 2021, officials accounted for 52% of the highest official positions, so temporary appointments became a common way of retaining political control.
Claim it supports
Peer status gives a concrete formal channel through which the top retains control over delegated functions.
Source limitation
Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Open source ↗
S04

Domestic NGOs qualitative field research - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2023. Mreža političkih pritisaka u centrima za socijalni rad. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
Testimonials describe centers as points in a hierarchical network in which business, contract and assistance can be linked to political loyalty and electoral mobilization.
Claim it supports
Field findings show local mediators connecting citizens, services and party hierarchy.
Source limitation
The sample is qualitative and anonymous; the findings reveal mechanisms and patterns, but do not measure their frequency in all centers.
Open source ↗
S05

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

What the source records
Analyzes how control of parliament allows one political center to further direct independent institutions.
Claim it supports
Supports the division of tasks through a formal parliamentary majority, while keeping the last word at the top.
Source limitation
Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Open source ↗
S06

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349

What the source records
Shows a combination of rewards and pressure to maintain relations between voters, employees and political mediators.
Claim it supports
Supports the claim that unwritten expectations of benefit, loyalty and punishment govern cooperation under formal rules.
Source limitation
Measures of experience and observation in one year; cannot verify each reported practice as a single legal case.
Open source ↗
S07

Reviewed scientific paper quantitative study of the network - Viewed full work, method, tables and bibliographic record

Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015.” Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3

What the source records
Network analysis shows how the secured votes and the position on the committee provide for a patronage benefit.
Claim it supports
Gives an immediate example of the internal rule of exchange: political contribution and network position are related to the distribution of work.
Source limitation
An anonymised city board and 2015 data do not represent the whole party, all cities or the current situation; records are retrospective and do not establish the legality of every employment.
Open source ↗
S08

Reviewed scientific paper municipal panel and political data - View full work and bibliographic record

Dragojević, Mila, and Andy Konitzer. 2013. “The Forensics of Patronage: Identifying the Linkage Between Parties and Public Sector Employment in Serbia.” Sociološki pregled 47(1): 3–22.

What the source records
Municipal data show that the composition of the ruling coalition influences the distribution of employment in public enterprises.
Claim it supports
Supports that power sharing is also needed among coalition partners who expect access to resources.
Source limitation
Data precede the current government and measures aggregate connectivity, not the motive or responsibility of the individual; local coalitions and the labour market changed after 2009.
Open source ↗
S09

peer-reviewed scientific paper comparative case studies - Viewed full text and bibliographic record

Tomić, Slobodan, and Dušan Pavlović. 2023. “Blatant, Not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 16(1): 181–209. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008

What the source records
Three cases show how appointments share control of politics, money and party mobilization.
Claim it supports
It links formal functions to informal expectations about who controls which institutional resource.
Source limitation
The three deliberately selected cases do not represent all high appointments; the patronage function and consequences are reconstructed by the authors from documents and publicly available data.
Open source ↗
S10

International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed

OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.

What the source records
Finds a large share of acting officers and weak management responsibilities despite developed formal rules.
Claim it supports
Shows how temporary appointments leave the division of jobs predictable for the top but uncertain for office holders.
Source limitation
The data mostly ends in mid-2024; the new methodology limits direct comparison of recent reports with older cycles, and part of the findings uses administration data and interviews.
Open source ↗
S11

International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

What the source records
Describes the practical dominance of the president and the party over institutions with a formally limited presidential role.
Claim it supports
Supports the distinction between published rules and a real center that can reward, direct or replace intermediaries.
Source limitation
It is a periodic expert assessment with its own methodology, not a peer-reviewed work that isolates a single cause.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

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