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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

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Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

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AVTOKRATIJA›Who really rules and what happens after the leader
15
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

What happens to the system when all power becomes tied to one person?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources10
Period199026

When all power is attached to one man, formal institutions are less and less resolving conflicts and more and more waiting for his decision. Associates do not know whether their position depends on rules or on current affection, so they have a reason to hide bad news, compete in loyalty and prevent others from gaining influence.

The biggest problem arises with inheritance: no one knows who can safely replace the leader, who will protect the old allies and whether the new top will respect the previous agreements. That is why the system can seem unique from the outside, and be fragile and full of fear from the inside. A power focused on one person can last for a long time, but its survival depends more on the health, assessment and mistakes of that person, while the peaceful change of the top is more difficult and dangerous.

Example from SerbiaChecked 10 sources; 9 manufacturers
10 related sources; 9 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 1

Both Milosevic and the current government in Serbia were strongly personalized, but none of them rested on just one man. After October 5, the election conditions and the top of the government were changed, but parts of the security networks, party patronage and informal rules continued to influence the state. That is why the departure of a personalized leader can open a change, but also leave the successor an apparatus that has been taught to listen to the top instead of the rules.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

Transition and security sector studies show a rapid electoral turnaround in 2000, but uneven reform of police, services, administration and other institutions in the years that followed.

02 Our interpretation

“The more decisions there are about one person, the more dependent the system is on them in the short term, but in the long term, the more decisive are the people, the networks and the rules that can survive their departure.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes the historical experience of Serbia shows both the possibility of a rapid decline of the leader and the slowness of the change of the deeper system.

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

The current system is not the same as Milosevic’s, and the future shift cannot be equated with 2000. The historical example serves as a mechanism of inheritance, not for predicting the outcome.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The power of one man does not have to fall quickly, just as collective rules do not guarantee peaceful change. Much depends on people around leaders, services and external support.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

review more research

Meng, A., Paine, J. i Powell, R. (2023), „Authoritarian Power Sharing“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.

Contribution to this answer
Meng, Paine and Powell show how power-sharing institutions can limit a leader only as long as allies have the real ability to implement a deal. When this ability weakens, the space for personalization grows.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Meng, A. (2020), Constraining Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Meng shows how leaders gradually remove institutions and actors that limit them and thus move power from collective structures to their own hands. Personalization is therefore a process, not just a personality trait.
Open source ↗
A03

comparing several countries or cases

Brownlee, J. (2007), Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Brownlee shows that strong ruling parties and cohesive elites can prevent the regime from being completely reduced to one man. When a party organization falls apart or subordinates to a leader, personalization becomes easier.
Open source ↗
A04

review more research

Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2018), How Dictatorships Work, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Geddes, Wright and Frantz follow how power in different dictatorships can be concentrated over time around a single leader and how it changes relationships within regime, politics, and the way the regime ends.
Open source ↗
A05

comparing several countries or cases

Svolik, M. W. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
“Svolik shows that personalization changes the fundamental problem of power-sharing: the less a leader depends on allies and institutions, the less they have the means to punish him, and his arbitrariness becomes greater.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Ejdus, Filip. 2010. Democratic Security Sector Governance in Serbia. PRIF Report No. 94. Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. ISBN 978-3-942532-04-4.

What the source records
The report shows that formal reform after 2000 has progressed unevenly and that political influence, weak accountability and old networks remain important problems.
Claim it supports
It shows that the change of power in 2000 did not immediately turn into a complete reform of security institutions.
Source limitation
The period ends before the SNS comes to power, so it is used for heritage and transition, not for assessing the current state of affairs.
Open source ↗
S02

Official election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

OSCE/ODIHR. 2001. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary Elections, 23 December 2000 — Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR.

What the source records
ODIHR said that the elections were a great progress and that in three months many earlier electoral flaws had been corrected.
Claim it supports
ODIHR confirms that the electoral conditions have improved rapidly, which allows comparison with slower deeper reforms.
Source limitation
“A good election day does not prove that the democratized police, judiciary, parties and administration, nor that the improvement will take place.
Open source ↗
S03

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929

What the source records
The work links the weakening of democracy with the rules and economic incentives that enable the authorities to turn public resources into a political advantage.
Claim it supports
The paper links today’s decline to unfinished institutional designs after 2000.
Source limitation
It is a causal interpretation of a long process; it does not cover developments beyond 2019 and does not exclude other explanations.
Open source ↗
S04

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 1617–1638. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860

What the source records
The author concludes that Serbia under Vucic has returned to competitive authoritarianism through gradual rather than abrupt regime change.
Claim it supports
Shows how a new competitive authoritarian system has been built on existing weaknesses.
Source limitation
The classification depends on the thresholds chosen and the data for the most part precedes the 2020-2025 elections.
Open source ↗
S05

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

What the source records
Follows the transformation of parliamentary majority and institutional control into personalised political governance.
Claim it supports
Supports that formal institutions in a personalized system are increasingly waiting for a signal from a single center instead of resolving conflicts on their own.
Source limitation
Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Open source ↗
S06

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17

What the source records
Explains the presidencialization of the parliamentary system through constitutional design, parties and political practice.
Claim it supports
It provides institutional evidence that power attaches to the person of the president and beyond the formal parliamentary order.
Source limitation
It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Open source ↗
S07

The International Longitudinal Democratic Index - Viewed official website, methodological framework and Serbia profile

International IDEA. 2025. Serbia — The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Poslednje ažuriranje: septembar 2025.

What the source records
There is a multi-year decline in the effectiveness of parliament and the credibility of elections while preserving the formal order.
Claim it supports
It shows that personalization can be gradual and leave institutions on paper, while weakening their ability to independently limit the top.
Source limitation
Composite indicators and expert assessments show the direction and dimensions of the change, but do not isolate one cause or prove each individual event.
Open source ↗
S08

International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

What the source records
“It places the president’s practical dominance over the government, parliament and judiciary in a broader decline in institutional autonomy.
Claim it supports
Independently confirms the strong attachment of the system to one political center.
Source limitation
It is a periodic expert assessment with its own methodology, not a peer-reviewed work that isolates a single cause.
Open source ↗
S09

Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821

What the source records
He concludes that changing the security sector requires more than one person to be replaced because structures and informal rules can survive the peak.
Claim it supports
Directly substantiates the claim that the departure of a personalized leader does not remove the apparatus taught to political loyalty.
Source limitation
The work starts from the concept of the captured state and is aimed at security and recommendations for reform, so its framework should be read together with wider and methodologically different sources.
Open source ↗
S10

Domestic think tank historical and institutional analysis - View full report, author data, chronology and conclusion

Popović, Đorđe, Predrag Petrović, Gorana Odanović i Jelena Radoman. 2011. Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Serbia 1989–2009. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

What the source records
It shows the rapid change of power in 2000, but also the retention of old personnel, unclear domains and unfinished service reform in the next decade.
Claim it supports
The historical example confirms the difference between the fall of a leader and the slower change of the system that is built around him.
Source limitation
The historical synthesis ends in 2009 and cannot describe today’s actors; part of the conclusions are based on then-available literature, interviews and public documents.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

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Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

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