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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

01 / 20

WHY THIS AREA MATTERS

How to recognize authoritarian rule and distinguish its forms

We first need to distinguish one bad decision from a system in which those in power become increasingly difficult to remove through elections or hold to account. These systems are not all alike, and they do not survive in the same way.
AVTOKRATIJA›How to recognize authoritarian rule and distinguish its forms
01
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

How can we tell that this is not just one bad decision, but an authoritarian way of governing?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources27
Period2012-2026; in particular 2023-2025

One bad or illegal decision in itself is not enough to talk about the authoritarian system. It is important what happens when a mistake is discovered: can the courts, the assembly, the media, independent bodies and citizens challenge it, correct it and hold those responsible accountable?

Authoritarian mode of government occurs when the government gradually weakens these very possibilities it adjusts the elections in its favor, punishes critics, takes over institutions and applies the law differently to allies and opponents. Therefore, it is not only crucial whether elections, courts and assemblies formally exist, but whether they can really limit the government and enable its dismissal.

Example from SerbiaChecked 27 sources; 23 manufacturers
27 related sources; 23 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 9

Reports on elections, the work of the Assembly, the security sector and the space for the activities of the media and associations note various problems: a great advantage of the government in the campaign, weak parliamentary control, political influence on institutions and pressures on those who control and criticize the authorities. When these findings are read together, it can be seen that this is not a bad decision, but a broader pattern that the government increasingly protects from control and equal political competition.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

In addition to academic studies and international monitoring, domestic organizations independently document the repetition of problems in several areas. CRTA monitors unequal elections and media, Open Parliament weakens parliamentary oversight, BCSP political control of security institutions, Transparency Serbia selective application of anti-corruption rules, and BCHR and Civic Initiatives a large number of concrete pressures and violations of rights.

02 Our interpretation

The strength of the conclusion is not that an organization calls Serbia authoritarian, but that different organizations, by methods adapted to their fields, find interrelated and repeated problems in institutions that should control the government.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes the form is confirmed by scientific, international and domestic sources

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Domestic organizations have a public mission to protect rights and democracy and their reports are not court verdicts. That is why we only use sources with the described methodology or verifiable documentation, we specify the limitations and do not declare any individual case as evidence of the whole system.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

There is no one perfect border. Different research measures slightly different when the government has become authoritarian, so border cases should be described, not just marked.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

Explain how the system works

Linz, J. J. (2000), Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner.

Contribution to this answer
Linz is one of the first to clearly demarcate authoritarians from totalitarian regimes according to him, authoritarian power does not have to control everything, but it stifles political competition, rarely lays accounts and does not respect the clear limits of its own power.
Open source ↗
A02

Development and verification of measurement methods

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. i Vreeland, J. R. (2010), „Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited“, Public Choice 143: 67–101.

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. i Vreeland, J. R. (2010), "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited", Public Choice 143: 67–101.

Contribution to this answer
“The authors offer concrete rules for separating democracy from dictatorship, but also a warning: the assessment depends on whether elections can really change power, not just whether elections exist.
Open source ↗
A03

comparison of different types of systems

Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), „Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective“, Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.

Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective", Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.

Contribution to this answer
The authors show that not all electoral autocracies are the same and that the way we classify them also changes the conclusions we draw from the data. That is why recognizing an authoritarian system requires more than one label or one event.
Open source ↗
A04

Development and verification of measurement methods

Teorell, J. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), „Beyond Democracy–Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789–2016“, Perspectives on Politics 17(1): 66–84.

Contribution to this answer
Teorell and Lindbergh distinguish five ways in which the executive power comes into office and leaves it inheritance, the military, the party, the direct elections and the confidence of the parliament. These grounds can overlap, so the regime cannot be reliably reduced to one label.
Open source ↗
A05

review more research

Brancati, D. (2014), „Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects“, Annual Review of Political Science 17: 313–326.

Contribution to this answer
Brancati shows that elections, parties and other democratic-like institutions can have an entirely authoritarian function: through them, the government collects information, shares benefits, monitors actors and stabilizes its own position.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 1617–1638. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860

What the source records
Changing the type of regime in Serbia using V-Dem indicators and dozens of criteria of competitive authoritarianism.
Claim it supports
This paper is crucial for the first issue because the conclusion is based on dozens of electoral and institutional criteria, so the Serbian case does not reduce to one decision or one scandal.
Source limitation
The classification depends on the thresholds chosen and the data for the most part precedes the 2020-2025 elections.
Open source ↗
S02

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Bieber, Florian. 2018. “Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans.” East European Politics 34(3): 337–354. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1490272

What the source records
Comparison of old and new patterns of competitive authoritarianism in the Western Balkans, including Serbia.
Claim it supports
Regional comparison shows that the pattern is recognized when weak institutions, informal control and unequal elections begin to work together and repeat themselves.
Source limitation
The regional comparison does not provide equally detailed evidence for every institution in Serbia.
Open source ↗
S03

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

What the source records
How control of parliament and its powers for appointments transfers power from the leader to the wider institutional system.
Claim it supports
The work has been monitoring continuity since 2012 and shows how control of parliament and appointments links multiple institutions into a more permanent pattern of government.
Source limitation
Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Open source ↗
S04

International scientific base and report - Verified 21.08.2026

Nord, Marina, David Altman, Tiago Fernandes, Ana Good God, i Staffan I. Lindberg. 2026. Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling the Democratic Era? University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, dataset v16.

What the source records
Hundreds of indicators of elections, freedoms, the rule of law and the limitations of executive power over time.
Claim it supports
V-Dem enables checking the long course through multiple indicators and in 2025 ranks Serbia as an electoral autocracy in the current episode of autocracy.
Source limitation
Categories depend on thresholds and expert assessments; the report itself warns of measurable uncertainty, and RoW typology is not the official position of V-Dem project management bodies.
Open source ↗
S05

International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

What the source records
Elections, rule of law, institutions, governance, economy and political integration in Serbia.
Claim it supports
BTI finds a simultaneous deterioration in elections, the rule of law and the media, and gives a modern check that the problem is not limited to one area.
Source limitation
It is a periodic expert assessment with its own methodology, not a peer-reviewed work that isolates a single cause.
Open source ↗
S06

Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.

What the source records
Functioning of democratic institutions, elections, parliament, administration, judiciary, corruption, media and civil society.
Claim it supports
During the same period, the European Commission documents problems in elections, parliament, judiciary, independent bodies and civil society, which enables the verification of forms by institutions.
Source limitation
The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Open source ↗
S07

Official election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

OSCE/ODIHR. 2024. Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 December 2023 — Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

What the source records
Legal framework, campaign, media, electoral roll, financing, election day and dispute resolution.
Claim it supports
At the same time, ODIHR saw in the 2023 elections a real choice of alternatives and systemic advantages of government, which accurately shows how formal elections can exist without equal match.
Source limitation
Proves the quality of one electoral process, not independently the entire type of regime or all the events after February 2024.
Open source ↗
S08

Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Burazer, Nikola. 2024. Serbia: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

What the source records
Seven areas of democracy, including elections, media, local government, judiciary, corruption and civil society.
Claim it supports
“Nations in Transit has seen a decline in several areas in the same year and through the same methodology compares it to earlier years, so it helps to separate the trend from the incident.
Source limitation
The assessments are expert and based on the thresholds of the organization; individual claims should be verified by primary and additional sources.
Open source ↗
S09

Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Freedom House. 2026. Freedom in the World 2026: Serbia Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

What the source records
Political rights and civil liberties, including elections, pluralism, expression, association and the rule of law.
Claim it supports
Freedom in the World shows that multi-party elections persist while political rights and civil liberties are narrowed, complementing the institutional findings of other sources.
Source limitation
A broad assessment of rights and freedoms does not explain the causes themselves, and the methodology and thresholds are not the same as with V-Dem, BTI or academic typologies.
Open source ↗
S10

Domestic NGOs election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report – 2023. Beograd: CRTA Election Observation Mission.

What the source records
It shows a repeated set of electoral and institutional practices throughout the election cycle, not just one irregularity.
Claim it supports
This monitoring is important for the first issue because it combines the campaign, election day and the reactions of institutions, so it can be checked if more problems together form a pattern.
Source limitation
The finding refers to one election cycle and represents an expert assessment of the domestic observation mission, not a court ruling or independent classification of the entire regime.
Open source ↗
S11

Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
Documents how the control function of the Assembly is weakened through repeated procedures and decisions throughout the convocation.
Claim it supports
This report shows that the form is not limited to elections, but continues in the day-to-day work of the institution that should control the executive power.
Source limitation
It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Open source ↗
S12

Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

What the source records
It connects several cases from the police, services and defence with the same mechanisms of weakening surveillance and political control.
Claim it supports
This study is important because it shows that from multiple verifiable cases comes to a cautious conclusion about the systemic pattern in one clearly limited sector.
Source limitation
Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Open source ↗
S13

Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.

What the source records
During the same period, it monitors multiple areas and notes that the concentration of power, poor control and pressures appear together.
Claim it supports
prEUgovor is useful because it shows the simultaneousity of problems in several institutions, which is a much stronger sign of an authoritarian way of governing than a single event.
Source limitation
It is the semi-annual report of the coalition with a clear reform and advocacy role, so its evaluations should be checked through the above examples, documents and sources for each area.
Open source ↗
S14

Domestic NGOs annual monitoring of human rights - Verified 21.08.2026

Beogradski centar za ljudska prava. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Urednik Dušan Pokuševski. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.

What the source records
The annual legal review and event collection shows repeated pressures against multiple social groups in 2025.
Claim it supports
This annual report allows us to check the general statement on a large number of specific cases and on the difference between the rights on paper and the conduct of institutions.
Source limitation
The report follows the rights and institutional treatment, not the type of regime; part of the numerical data is taken from state authorities and other organizations and should be read with their original records.
Open source ↗
S15

Domestic NGO monitoring of civic space - Verified 21.08.2026

Građanske inicijative. 2025. Udruženja građana — sužavanje prostora za delovanje 2024. Beograd: Građanske inicijative.

What the source records
It systematically brings together hundreds of documented cases of pressure on expression, assembly and association over the course of a year.
Claim it supports
"This report is important because it preserves a number of local and sectoral examples that show repetition together, but does not claim to have registered every incident in the country.
Source limitation
The records include documented and reported cases, and not a representative rate of all incidents in Serbia, while the organization at the same time has a clear role of protecting the civil space.
Open source ↗
S16

Domestic NGOs anti-corruption parallel report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đorđević, Miloš, i Nemanja Nenadić. 2023. Civil Society Report on the Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Serbia. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija i UNCAC Coalition.

What the source records
Shows a repeated gap between the broad legal framework and selective or weak application in a number of anti-corruption areas.
Claim it supports
“This report shows that the authoritarian pattern does not have to come from repealing the law, but through its long-term unequal or ineffective application.
Source limitation
The report is thematically related to UNCAC and ends in mid-2023, so it does not specify the type of regime or cover later development and all forms of political control.
Open source ↗
S17

Domestic NGOs and research media case study - Verified 21.08.2026

Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.

What the source records
Twelve case studies link it to seven repeated mechanisms of political influence on the judiciary, the prosecution and the police.
Claim it supports
This study is a good model of how individual cases are checked and compared before concluding that there is a broader institutional pattern.
Source limitation
Cases precede recent institutional changes and cannot prove that every action today is politically controlled, but they provide an important early point for monitoring continuity.
Open source ↗
S18

Domestic NGO ten-year monitoring synthesis - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2026. A Decade of Election Observation: Is Everything the Same, Worse, or Better? Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
Ten years of election observation gives a time series of the same problems and records their deepening.
Claim it supports
“This retrospective directly answers the first question because it shows the difference between one controversial choice and problems that have been recurring and deepening throughout the decade.
Source limitation
It is a short institutional retrospective, not a new methodological report; the claims should be checked in the individual election reports on which the synthesis is based.
Open source ↗
S19

The International Longitudinal Democratic Index - Viewed official website, methodological framework and Serbia profile

International IDEA. 2025. Serbia — The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Poslednje ažuriranje: septembar 2025.

What the source records
Timely compares representation, parliament, elections and civil liberties and finds significant multi-dimensional declines between 2019 and 2024.
Claim it supports
Supports the claim that we recognize the authoritarian pattern by repeating and spreading the problem across multiple control areas rather than one decision.
Source limitation
Composite indicators and expert assessments show the direction and dimensions of the change, but do not isolate one cause or prove each individual event.
Open source ↗
S20

Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed

European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.

What the source records
The same report notes political pressure on the judiciary, weak parliamentary oversight, REM problems, the resources of independent bodies and pressure on civil society.
Claim it supports
Gives a new, modern multi-sectoral confirmation that related problems appear simultaneously in institutions that should control the government.
Source limitation
The report serves to monitor European standards and relies on state, international and civil society inputs; it does not give scientific classification of the regime or independently check any submitted claim.
Open source ↗
S21

International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed

OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.

What the source records
Through 1,732 criteria, it finds a gap between formal rules and practices in public administration, accountability, appointments and public finance.
Claim it supports
Expands the verification of the form to the state administration and shows that the problem is not limited to elections, media or individual scandals.
Source limitation
The data mostly ends in mid-2024; the new methodology limits direct comparison of recent reports with older cycles, and part of the findings uses administration data and interviews.
Open source ↗
S22

Independent international monitoring of media pluralism - Viewed official country page and available full report

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), European University Institute. 2026. Media Pluralism Monitor 2026: Serbia.

What the source records
The standardised framework finds a high risk in all four areas of media pluralism, especially in political independence.
Claim it supports
Supports the media part of the wider pattern independent of domestic election and parliamentary monitoring.
Source limitation
It is a structured expert risk assessment that also uses local sources; it does not measure hypothetical election results without media bias or each newsroom individually.
Open source ↗
S23

Domestic NGOs institutional and judicial monitoring - Full report and methodology reviewed

Mandić, Sofija, i CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council: 2025.

What the source records
Follows the work of the two judicial councils of claims and records both progress and unfulfilled recommendations on public decision-making.
Claim it supports
It adds immediate domestic institutional evidence that control problems are not limited to elections and the media.
Source limitation
Analysis primarily measures transparency based on publicly available data; it does not prove the political influence in every decision or the quality of each appointment.
Open source ↗
S24

Local media network local survey and field research - Full report and methodology reviewed

Cvejić, Bojan, i ANEM. 2026. Indikatori stanja lokalnih medija u Srbiji za 2025. godinu: studija slučaja osam gradova i opština i jednog regiona.

What the source records
In nine local areas, freedom, security, economic position and access to information declined between 2024 and 2025.
Claim it supports
Adds a local level and shows that the national pattern is seen in different environments and through multiple types of pressure.
Source limitation
The sample of journalists and selected environments are not representative of the whole of Serbia, and the evaluations express the experiences and assessments of the participants, not the rate of all incidents.
Open source ↗
S25

Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables

Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.

What the source records
The primary data records a large number of complaints about the silence of the administration and a fifth of unexecuted orders for the delivery of information.
Claim it supports
Shows a verifiable gap between formal law and the behaviour of authorities, including public companies.
Source limitation
The report measures the cases that have reached the Commissioner and the conduct within his competence; it does not cover all the requirements in the country or determine the political motive of non-compliance.
Open source ↗
S26

Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables

Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije. 2026. Redovan godišnji izveštaj Zaštitnika građana za 2025. godinu.

What the source records
It records 6,317 established violations of rights, but also 86.74% of actions according to 915 recommendations of the Protector of Citizens.
Claim it supports
At the same time, it confirms a broad institutional problem and prevents exaggeration: corrective mechanisms have not completely disappeared.
Source limitation
Data refer to the subject matter of the Protector and his own system of records; the high rate of conduct does not measure the quality of each response or the state of all control institutions.
Open source ↗
S27

Primary source annual report of the state anti-corruption body - Viewed full official report and tables

Agencija za sprečavanje korupcije Republike Srbije. 2026. Annual Report 2025.

What the source records
It shows that many local governments have formally adopted anti-corruption plans, but significantly less have formed appropriate monitoring bodies.
Claim it supports
substantiates the claim that the form should be sought in a repeated gap between the formal obligation and the mechanism to implement it.
Source limitation
It is an independent report of the body on its own work; the data show institutional scope and gaps, but do not represent an independent assessment of the effectiveness of each plan or decision.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

Who is behind AUTLAS?

AUTLAS and AVtokratija were conceived and are developed by Civic Initiatives. Content is updated in line with new research and reliable data.

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