Does it matter whether a government emerged through a coup, war, revolution, or the gradual weakening of democracy?
Yes, because the way government is created usually determines its first supports, fears and rules.
The government created by the military coup must resolve the relationship with the officers who brought it to power; the revolutionary government often relies on the party and organizations created during the struggle; the government created in the war can long justify the concentration of power by the security threat. When democracy weakens gradually, elected leaders more often use existing laws, elections and institutions to change them from within to their advantage. Yet the origin is influenced by who can replace the leader and what kind of crisis is not the best.
Multiannual reports on Serbia do not show a single moment in which the democratic system was suddenly abolished. They record a gradual deepening of media imbalance, concentration of political power, weakening of parliamentary and institutional supervision and increasingly unfavorable conditions for critical media and organizations. Elections, laws and institutions have remained in place, but over time they have become less and less able to limit power and enable equal political change.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
CRTA’s review of ten years of election observation notes that key problems have not been solved and that many have deepened. The study on political control of the judiciary, prosecution and police documents mechanisms already by 2018, BCSP monitors them in the security sector 2019-2024, while the Open Parliament, prEUgovor and Civic Initiatives record their further development in parliament, reforms and the civil space 2024-2025.
This timeline corresponds to the gradual weakening of democracy: the government was won by elections, and the institutions were not abolished by a single move, but their control functions changed through a series of laws, appointments, procedures, resources and informal practices.
Yes domestic sources give more time points of gradual erosion
Continuity does not mean that every period was the same, nor does one cause explain all the changes. War heritage, transition weaknesses, party system, European integration, economy and foreign policy incentives remain part of the explanation.
Origin is not destiny. War, economy, new leader and external support can later completely change the initial way of governing.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
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Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2018), How Dictatorships Work, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Geddes, Wright and Frantz show that the way in which dictatorship arises leaves a long organizational trail: who initially held power and how the regime is organized influences the later distribution of power, personalization, and the way it falls.
comparing several countries or cases
Brownlee, J. (2007), Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Brownlee shows that the historically built party organization and cohesion of the elites can give the authoritarian regime much greater resistance to political crises. The initial institutional structure therefore affects what the regime can later endure.
review more research
Bermeo, N. (2016), „On Democratic Backsliding“, Journal of Democracy 27(1): 5–19.
- Contribution to this answer
- Bermeo shows that modern autocracy often begins not with a coup, but with a gradual expansion of the executive power and a strategic change in electoral conditions. The manner of emergence of today’s authoritarianism can therefore be quite different from the classical military dictatorship.
review more research
Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2021), Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Haggard and Kaufman show how elected authorities can gradually collapse democracy through polarization, rearrangement of the party system and weakening of restrictions. The path by which the system enters autocracy also affects the actors and institutions that remain capable of opposing it.
review more research
Meng, A., Paine, J. i Powell, R. (2023), „Authoritarian Power Sharing“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.
- Contribution to this answer
- Meng, Paine and Powell show that the ability of the founding coalition to force a leader to respect a deal affects how much division of power will later be real. The origin of the regime therefore also determines what threats the leader expects from his associates.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 1617–1638. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860
- What the source records
- Changing the type of regime in Serbia using V-Dem indicators and dozens of criteria of competitive authoritarianism.
- Claim it supports
- "Castaldo describes the Serbian case as a double transition to democracy and back and ties a new setback for elected leaders, which clearly distinguishes it from the coup.
- Source limitation
- The classification depends on the thresholds chosen and the data for the most part precedes the 2020-2025 elections.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Bieber, Florian. 2018. “Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans.” East European Politics 34(3): 337–354. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1490272
- What the source records
- Comparison of old and new patterns of competitive authoritarianism in the Western Balkans, including Serbia.
- Claim it supports
- Bieber shows how authoritarian practices have returned after a period of democratization, relying on unreformed weak institutions and weakened external incentives.
- Source limitation
- The regional comparison does not provide equally detailed evidence for every institution in Serbia.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346
- What the source records
- How control of parliament and its powers for appointments transfers power from the leader to the wider institutional system.
- Claim it supports
- Milačić follows the gradual decline since the 2012 election through the control of parliament and appointments, and shows how democracy can be weakened from within.
- Source limitation
- Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17
- What the source records
- Why the parliamentary constitutional model in practice gets strong presidential qualities.
- Claim it supports
- The study of presidencialization shows that the distribution of power can be changed in practice while the formal parliamentary constitution remains in force.
- Source limitation
- It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Kakarnias, Theofanis. 2025. “Decoding Serbia’s Democratic Backsliding: EU Conditionality Meets Domestic Realities.” European Political Science 24(3): 293–312. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-025-00518-8
- What the source records
- How domestic factors and the weakened credibility of European conditionality come together to explain the democratic backlash.
- Claim it supports
- Kakarnias explains how domestic interests and uncertain European conditionality have shaped the way back, and shows why the origin of power is not the only important factor.
- Source limitation
- The paper explains part of the cause and the external environment, and does not offer a complete classification of the regime.
International scientific base and report - Verified 21.08.2026
Nord, Marina, David Altman, Tiago Fernandes, Ana Good God, i Staffan I. Lindberg. 2026. Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling the Democratic Era? University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, dataset v16.
- What the source records
- Hundreds of indicators of elections, freedoms, the rule of law and the limitations of executive power over time.
- Claim it supports
- The V-Dem weather series views Serbia as an ongoing episode of autocracy, which is methodologically different from a one-off event such as a military coup.
- Source limitation
- Categories depend on thresholds and expert assessments; the report itself warns of measurable uncertainty, and RoW typology is not the official position of V-Dem project management bodies.
Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Burazer, Nikola. 2024. Serbia: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
- What the source records
- Seven areas of democracy, including elections, media, local government, judiciary, corruption and civil society.
- Claim it supports
- “Nations in Transit’s annual scores have seen a gradual decline across multiple consecutive cycles and areas, which supports a description of erosion rather than the abrupt abolition of democracy.
- Source limitation
- The assessments are expert and based on the thresholds of the organization; individual claims should be verified by primary and additional sources.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- Functioning of democratic institutions, elections, parliament, administration, judiciary, corruption, media and civil society.
- Claim it supports
- “The European Commission shows that the constitution, parliament, elections and courts formally exist while their autonomy and effectiveness are gradually diminishing, which is a typical trace of erosion from within.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Domestic NGOs election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report – 2023. Beograd: CRTA Election Observation Mission.
- What the source records
- Gives a detailed picture of the later phase of electoral decline after several previous election cycles.
- Claim it supports
- “This report shows what a mature phase of gradual erosion looks like: elections are still being held, but earlier problems are coming together with new forms of institutional abuse.
- Source limitation
- The finding refers to one election cycle and represents an expert assessment of the domestic observation mission, not a court ruling or independent classification of the entire regime.
Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Documents the later phase of the weakening of parliamentary scrutiny without formally abolishing the assembly.
- Claim it supports
- This report shows why the origin is important: with gradual erosion, the institution remains in place, but its actual function is changed through a series of procedures and practices.
- Source limitation
- It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
- What the source records
- Documenting the mechanisms for capturing the security sector as early as 2019-2020, between earlier elections and newer stages of decline.
- Claim it supports
- This study gives an important mean point in the timeline and shows that the change was not caused by a single coup, but by a gradual weakening of supervision and professional boundaries.
- Source limitation
- Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
- What the source records
- It links previous findings on capture to state and reform needs by 2024.
- Claim it supports
- “This paper helps to see how once established institutional ties are maintained and why their unbundling requires a different path from the overthrow of the government created by the military coup.
- Source limitation
- The work starts from the concept of the captured state and is aimed at security and recommendations for reform, so its framework should be read together with wider and methodologically different sources.
Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.
- What the source records
- Resumption and deepening of forms in the period 2024-2025, including continuity of access after change of government.
- Claim it supports
- prEUgovor gives a modern point in a longer line and shows that gradual erosion persists through formal reform processes, cabinet changes and existing constitutional institutions.
- Source limitation
- It is the semi-annual report of the coalition with a clear reform and advocacy role, so its evaluations should be checked through the above examples, documents and sources for each area.
Domestic NGO monitoring of civic space - Verified 21.08.2026
Građanske inicijative. 2025. Udruženja građana — sužavanje prostora za delovanje 2024. Beograd: Građanske inicijative.
- What the source records
- Documenting the intensification of pressures on the civil space during 2024 as part of the trend followed in previous years.
- Claim it supports
- This report shows how gradual erosion becomes visible in everyday life: the number, type and intensity of pressures change, although formal rights remain written in the laws.
- Source limitation
- The records include documented and reported cases, and not a representative rate of all incidents in Serbia, while the organization at the same time has a clear role of protecting the civil space.
Domestic NGOs and research media case study - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.
- What the source records
- It shows that the mechanisms of political influence on the judiciary, the prosecution and the police were documented as early as 2018.
- Claim it supports
- This study is an important time point because it shows that the problems did not arise overnight in the latest crisis, but the institutional mechanisms could have been monitored years earlier.
- Source limitation
- Cases precede recent institutional changes and cannot prove that every action today is politically controlled, but they provide an important early point for monitoring continuity.
Domestic NGO ten-year monitoring synthesis - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2026. A Decade of Election Observation: Is Everything the Same, Worse, or Better? Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- He summarizes ten election years and states that the same problems have not been solved, but that many have deepened.
- Claim it supports
- “This ten-year synthesis shows most directly why Serbia is an example of the gradual weakening of democracy, and not the government created by a violent break in the constitutional order.
- Source limitation
- It is a short institutional retrospective, not a new methodological report; the claims should be checked in the individual election reports on which the synthesis is based.
The International Longitudinal Democratic Index - Viewed official website, methodological framework and Serbia profile
International IDEA. 2025. Serbia — The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Poslednje ažuriranje: septembar 2025.
- What the source records
- Document significant declines in multiple democratic dimensions between 2019 and 2024, without formally abolishing the order.
- Claim it supports
- Directly supports the claim of gradual weakening, rather than a single founding event such as a coup.
- Source limitation
- Composite indicators and expert assessments show the direction and dimensions of the change, but do not isolate one cause or prove each individual event.
Independent international monitoring of media pluralism - Viewed official country page and available full report
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), European University Institute. 2026. Media Pluralism Monitor 2026: Serbia.
- What the source records
- “For 2025, there is a sharp deterioration in the media environment, pressures, political control and institutional problems, along with formal media laws.
- Claim it supports
- It shows how the earlier gradual trend can continue and accelerate in a crisis period without a formal regime change.
- Source limitation
- It is a structured expert risk assessment that also uses local sources; it does not measure hypothetical election results without media bias or each newsroom individually.
Domestic journalistic association monitoring of attacks - Verified 21.08.2026
Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospektiva 2025: godina u kojoj je pritisak postao sistem. Beograd: NUNS.
- What the source records
- The NUNS annual records for 2025 show a large number of physical, legal, economic and digital pressures on journalists.
- Claim it supports
- It complements long-term indices with a concrete signal that the gradual process in a crisis year is seen through everyday forms of pressure.
- Source limitation
- The register depends on the reported and documented cases, it can overlap with other databases and does not measure the experience of every journalist.
Domestic NGOs analysis of the political crisis - Verified 21.08.2026
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. 2025. Political and Institutional Crisis in Serbia: Possible Scenarios. Belgrade: BCSP.
- What the source records
- Analyzes political and institutional crisis, mass mobilization, repression and possible scenarios without claiming that the outcome is predetermined.
- Claim it supports
- It helps to separate origin and later evolution: a gradually weakened system can enter a crisis and change without a coup or a formal interruption.
- Source limitation
- Scenario analysis is time-sensitive and does not predict the future; it is based on information available until November 2025.
Local media network local survey and field research - Full report and methodology reviewed
Cvejić, Bojan, i ANEM. 2026. Indikatori stanja lokalnih medija u Srbiji za 2025. godinu: studija slučaja osam gradova i opština i jednog regiona.
- What the source records
- By comparing the same local indicators, the overall score drops from 2.53 in 2024 to 2.23 in 2025.
- Claim it supports
- Adds a short local timeline showing a step-by-step change instead of a single national event.
- Source limitation
- The sample of journalists and selected environments are not representative of the whole of Serbia, and the evaluations express the experiences and assessments of the participants, not the rate of all incidents.
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