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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLAS Explore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.
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SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

01 / 20

WHY THIS AREA MATTERS

How to recognize authoritarian rule and distinguish its forms

We first need to distinguish one bad decision from a system in which those in power become increasingly difficult to remove through elections or hold to account. These systems are not all alike, and they do not survive in the same way.
AVTOKRATIJA›How to recognize authoritarian rule and distinguish its forms
02
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

What is the difference between an authoritarian leader, the current government, and the system as a whole?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources21
Period201726; structural roots before 2012.

The leader is the most visible face of the government, but no leader governs completely alone. He needs people who make and implement decisions, control money, information, party, police, administration and local networks.

The current government is that circle of people in positions, while the system consists of formal rules and unwritten relations that determine who gets protection, who gets the punishment and how the government can be controlled or replaced. If institutions, public companies, media and local networks continue to reward loyalty and punish independence, this way of government can survive the departure of one man. That is why changing the leader is not the same as changing the system.

Example from SerbiaChecked 21 sources; 17 manufacturers
21 related sources; 17 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 8

Election and media monitoring shows that political decision-making and government representation are largely tied to Aleksandar Vucic, including campaigns in which he is not a candidate. At the same time, reports on parliament, public institutions and the security sector show that such domination is carried out through the ruling party and institutions at different levels. That is why sources not only describe the power of one man, but the system that transmits and maintains that power.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01 Established fact

Domestic monitoring shows concrete channels between the leader and the system. For 2024, CRTA measured that more than half of the television time for political actors went to the president, the Open Parliament records the dominant influence of the executive power on the assembly, BCSP describes political ties in the security sector, and Transparency Serbia documents the intertwining of the presidential function and the promotion of the party list.

02 Our interpretation

These findings show that personal power becomes systemic when it is regularly communicated by the media, the parliamentary majority, appointments, procedures, supervisory bodies and informal rules. That is why the departure of the leader does not automatically guarantee the change of all these ties.

03 Does it show the same process?

Yes domestic sources show the channels through which personal power becomes systemic

04 Important caveat or alternative explanation

Serbia did not have a shift of the current center of power, so sources cannot directly prove what would survive it. They can show existing connections and institutions that would have to change in order for a personal shift to become a change of the system.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

When one leader suppresses the party, the army and the state, these differences blur. That is why it is necessary to watch how many other people and institutions can really say ‘no’ to him.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

Explain how the system works

Linz, J. J. (2000), Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner.

Contribution to this answer
The Linz regime defines through the rules and structure of political power, and not through the personality of a single leader. That is why the shift of the man at the top does not have to change the system if the limited pluralism and weak responsibility remain the same.
Open source ↗
A02

comparing several countries or cases

Svolik, M. W. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Svolik shows that a dictator never rules alone: he must simultaneously control society and share power with the elites on which he relies. That is why the leader, the ruling group and the regime are three different levels of analysis.
Open source ↗
A03

review more research

Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2018), How Dictatorships Work, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
It follows the whole life cycle of dictatorships how they arise, how the power within them divides or concentrates around one person, and how and why they eventually fall. This shows why the structure of the system cannot be reduced to one person.
Open source ↗
A04

review more research

Meng, A., Paine, J. i Powell, R. (2023), „Authoritarian Power Sharing“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.

Contribution to this answer
Meng, Paine and Powell explain when the division of power in autocracy becomes real: it is not enough for co-workers to get functions or benefits, but there must be ways to enforce the agreement and have the leader bear the price if he violates it.
Open source ↗
A05

Development and verification of measurement methods

Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2014), „Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set“, Perspectives on Politics 12(2): 313–331.

Contribution to this answer
Geddes, Wright and Frantz separate the departure of the leader from the end of the regime: after the overthrow of the dictator, the same authoritarian order can survive, be succeeded by another autocracy, or only then can democratization begin.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Primary legal source - Verified 21.08.2026

Republika Srbija. 2006. Ustav Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik RS 98/2006, engleski prevod Narodne skupštine.

What the source records
Formal division of legislative, executive and judicial power and constitutional powers of the president, government and assembly.
Claim it supports
The Constitution distinguishes between the functions of the president, the government and the assembly without which it is impossible to accurately assess where the practical power has strayed from the formal rules.
Source limitation
The Constitution says that power should be distributed, but it does not show how powers are used in practice.
Open source ↗
S02

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17

What the source records
Why the parliamentary constitutional model in practice gets strong presidential qualities.
Claim it supports
Jovanovic explains why the parliamentary system can be presidencialized and shows that personal power depends on the electoral system, party relations and constitutional weaknesses.
Source limitation
It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Open source ↗
S03

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

What the source records
How control of parliament and its powers for appointments transfers power from the leader to the wider institutional system.
Claim it supports
Milačić shows how parliament and the powers for appointments transfer the influence of the leader to institutions, which clearly separates a person from the mechanisms that enable him to rule.
Source limitation
Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Open source ↗
S04

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Ugarković, Uroš. 2023. “What Is Parliamentarism to Populists? The Populist Redefinition of the Concept of Parliamentarism in Parliamentary Debates in Post-Milošević Serbia.” Redescriptions 26(2): 160–175. https://doi.org/10.33134/rds.403

What the source records
How the meaning of parliament changed in the parliamentary debates before and after the SNS came to power.
Claim it supports
The analysis of parliamentary debates shows how parliamentary subordination to the executive power is normalized and thus transformed from political practice into part of the expected behavior of the system.
Source limitation
Analyzing speech and congregational practices, it does not measure the whole regime or all the centers of power.
Open source ↗
S05

International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

What the source records
Elections, rule of law, institutions, governance, economy and political integration in Serbia.
Claim it supports
BTI directly compares the limited constitutional role of the president to its assessment of practical dominance over government, parliament, and the judiciary.
Source limitation
It is a periodic expert assessment with its own methodology, not a peer-reviewed work that isolates a single cause.
Open source ↗
S06

Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.

What the source records
Functioning of democratic institutions, elections, parliament, administration, judiciary, corruption, media and civil society.
Claim it supports
“The European Commission is concerned that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea and at the same time seeking greater autonomy from independent bodies.
Source limitation
The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Open source ↗
S07

Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Freedom House. 2026. Freedom in the World 2026: Serbia Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

What the source records
Political rights and civil liberties, including elections, pluralism, expression, association and the rule of law.
Claim it supports
Freedom House shows the practical interweaving of the presidential, party and electoral roles and adds a picture of how the leader relies on a wider network of institutions and resources.
Source limitation
A broad assessment of rights and freedoms does not explain the causes themselves, and the methodology and thresholds are not the same as with V-Dem, BTI or academic typologies.
Open source ↗
S08

Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
The figures show how the personal visibility of the president becomes a stable feature of the media environment.
Claim it supports
Media monitoring is important because it shows that the power of a leader rests not only on his personality, but also on a system that constantly provides him with access and favorable treatment.
Source limitation
The sample includes the central news of five national TV stations, but does not measure all media, the entire program offer, the audience or the direct impact of such reporting on voting.
Open source ↗
S09

Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.

What the source records
It shows how political dominance is transmitted through procedures, the majority and the weakening of the parliamentary oversight role.
Claim it supports
“This report helps to separate the leader from the system because it shows concrete parliamentary mechanisms through which personal political power is transformed into an institutional routine.
Source limitation
It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Open source ↗
S10

Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

What the source records
Document the network of political control, appointment, financing and poor supervision in security institutions.
Claim it supports
The study shows that the system is made up of connections, procedures and dependencies that can last longer than one government or one man, even when his authority is currently connecting them.
Source limitation
Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Open source ↗
S11

Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821

What the source records
Consider which structures of the captured state maintain the order and what reforms would be needed to change them.
Claim it supports
“This paper shows most clearly why changing leadership is not the same as dissolving the system of institutions, interests and informal rules that enable it to rule.
Source limitation
The work starts from the concept of the captured state and is aimed at security and recommendations for reform, so its framework should be read together with wider and methodologically different sources.
Open source ↗
S12

Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.

What the source records
Describes the continuity of the way of decision-making and reform stalemate through the change of government and several state areas.
Claim it supports
prEUgovor helps to see the difference between changing the composition of the government and changing the way the system works, because it monitors whether real institutions and practices change after personal changes.
Source limitation
It is the semi-annual report of the coalition with a clear reform and advocacy role, so its evaluations should be checked through the above examples, documents and sources for each area.
Open source ↗
S13

Domestic NGO campaign financing monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Povećanje nesrazmere među akterima, procena ukupne vrednosti kampanje i preliminarni izveštaji: monitoring izbora 2023. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija.

What the source records
“It documents the intertwining of the presidential function with the promotion of the party list and the reaction of the authorities who should be guarding that border.
Claim it supports
This monitoring provides a very clear example of the difference between the function, the party and the system: the problem is not only the performance of the president, but also the way in which the competent authorities determine and apply borders.
Source limitation
It is a preliminary and narrowly thematic report for a single campaign; part of the conclusions are estimates and arguments for doubts, not legally determined infringements.
Open source ↗
S14

Domestic NGOs and research media case study - Verified 21.08.2026

Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.

What the source records
Shows how political influence works through appointments, discretion, information, statistics and handling in sensitive cases.
Claim it supports
This study shows that personal political will becomes systemic only when it is incorporated into the actions and incentives of the police, prosecutors’ offices and courts.
Source limitation
Cases precede recent institutional changes and cannot prove that every action today is politically controlled, but they provide an important early point for monitoring continuity.
Open source ↗
S15

Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed

European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.

What the source records
“It separates the president’s constitutional powers from his concerns that he is in practice directing political debate and decision-making, with weak parliamentaryism and pressure on the judiciary.
Claim it supports
Directly shows the difference between the person, the formal function and the system of institutions through which power is transferred.
Source limitation
The report serves to monitor European standards and relies on state, international and civil society inputs; it does not give scientific classification of the regime or independently check any submitted claim.
Open source ↗
S16

International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed

OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.

What the source records
Finds too many officeholders, formalist political reform management and weak managerial responsibility.
Claim it supports
It shows that a leader’s authority becomes systemic when it turns into naming and governance patterns that outlive a single day’s decision.
Source limitation
The data mostly ends in mid-2024; the new methodology limits direct comparison of recent reports with older cycles, and part of the findings uses administration data and interviews.
Open source ↗
S17

Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026

European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.

What the source records
At the end of 2021, officials accounted for 52% of the highest official positions.
Claim it supports
Supports the claim that political control is transmitted through personnel mechanisms in the state administration, and not only through public appearances of the leader.
Source limitation
Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Open source ↗
S18

Domestic NGOs analysis of public companies - Verified 21.08.2026

Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Public Enterprises — A Symbol of Abuses and Violation of the Law. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.

What the source records
Follow competitions, directors, management and political connections in public companies.
Claim it supports
It adds an economic and governance channel through which the ruling circle can transform political power into permanent institutional control.
Source limitation
Anti-corruption analysis identifies risks and documented irregularities, but does not prove the criminal responsibility of every manager or company.
Open source ↗
S19

Domestic media associations survey and qualitative research - Verified 21.08.2026

Asocijacija medija, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Lokal pres i Slavko Ćuruvija fondacija. 2023. Strategija razvoja medijskog sistema Srbije (2020–2025) i njena implementacija: saznanja, stavovi i predlozi medijskih radnika. Beograd.

What the source records
Media workers describe political influence through financing, regulators and non-application of formal rules.
Claim it supports
It shows that the system includes intermediaries and institutions that shape the visibility of the leader and the competition, not just the personal communication of a politician.
Source limitation
The sample of media workers and interviews do not represent all the newsrooms or the entire audience; they find measures of experience and attitudes of the professional community.
Open source ↗
S20

Domestic NGOs institutional and judicial monitoring - Full report and methodology reviewed

Mandić, Sofija, i CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council: 2025.

What the source records
Analyzes who, how and how publicly decides in judicial councils, including the election of judges and prosecutors, and protection from undue influence.
Claim it supports
Complements the distinction between the leader and the system through concrete institutional hubs through which human and disciplinary power is exercised.
Source limitation
Analysis primarily measures transparency based on publicly available data; it does not prove the political influence in every decision or the quality of each appointment.
Open source ↗
S21

Primary source official regulatory monitoring of media - Full official report, methodology and end tables

Regulatorno telo za elektronske medije (REM). 2025. Izbori 2023 — završni izveštaj monitoringa pružalaca medijskih usluga.

What the source records
It officially measures the enormous visibility of the list named after the president and the presence of state officials in election media time.
Claim it supports
It shows how the personality of the president, the state office, the party list and the media system can be combined into one advantage.
Source limitation
The official regulator measures time and tonality according to its own methodology, and the full report is published with considerable delay; the data does not measure the immediate effect on voting and the conclusions of the regulator require comparison with other monitoring.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

Who is behind AUTLAS?

AUTLAS and AVtokratija were conceived and are developed by Civic Initiatives. Content is updated in line with new research and reliable data.

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